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1 Introduction 
Financial institutions, such as banks, are eager to offer their services in ways that match 
the modern consumer expectations and provide the maximum convenience for the users. 
One recent major trend is offering native mobile applications that can be downloaded 
from the online application stores and installed on the end users smart phone and tablet 
devices. A common requirement for these applications is secure invocation of remote 
services for interaction with existing company core business functions. In terms of 
communication protocols, messaging formats and security solutions there are several 
possibilities how to arrange the remote communications. This thesis investigates some 
of the alternatives that have reached sufficient maturity for a large financial corporation 
(hereby referred as the Bank) and presents an architectural solution for building a new 
mobile communication and distribution channel. This new channel will enable access to 
the same core business functions which can currently be reached via the Bank’s existing 
channels, such as Internet Banking portals and Contact Centers.  
The Bank has chosen Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) as one of the primary pat-
terns to manage, control and utilize the large amount of internal services. Existing and 
still developing SOA architecture inside the Bank is the foundation and one of the driv-
ing forces influencing how to develop and design future services that are exposed to the 
open internet for mobile consumers. One typical property of SOA services is that they 
are stateless [Erl06]; stateless services bring several benefits with simplified service 
design and excellent scaling characteristics. These benefits will specifically realize in 
multilayered applications [RiR07]. 
Providing stateless services for consumers outside of the company’s internal network 
barrier also introduces new challenges in addition to the mentioned benefits. These chal-
lenges commonly relate to how to manage context data related to the user session, and 
especially, how to manage the authentication state of the user. If a service is stateless, 
session state is not hold by the service provider. This means that every request must 
contain all the necessary context data for the service to be able to process the request 
including the authentication related data. Independent authenticating of request messag-
es is an obvious change in paradigm when comparing to the traditional secure Web ap-
plications where the authentication state is stored by the server after the initial user au-
thentication.  
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Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) based Web Services on top of HTTP protocol 
have for years been the de-facto technical solution for publishing and invoking autono-
mous services in internal SOA architectures [CCY11]. SOAP protocol as such is not 
perfectly matched for mobile use for various reasons detailed later in the thesis. The 
main challenger for SOAP is Representational State Transfer (REST, or often “REST-
ful”) based services that have quickly gained a de-facto status among Web developers 
and surpassed SOAP based services in the internet facing usage [VVP12]. A key prom-
ise of REST is to be simple and adhere to the basic structures that are built in to the 
World Wide Web [Fie00]. SOAP based Web Services and RESTful services fulfill to the 
same fundamental client-server pattern, but also differ in many ways such as transport 
protocols, message content types and security. 
To understand which messaging protocol is best suited for the selected mobile plat-
forms; Google Android, Apple iOS and Microsoft Windows Phone, it is important to 
acknowledge what kind capabilities these platforms possess in terms of remote commu-
nication protocols and security features. Current mobile platforms and devices are lack-
ing some of the processing power, network bandwidth and the mature authentication 
standards that are available with traditional computing platforms. There is a strong need 
to come up with a creative solution that will still conform to the fundamental security 
principles and strict requirements of the financial institutions. 
Using the constructive research method this thesis produces an implementation-
independent architectural description for a mobile channel to access and consume finan-
cial services in a secure way. Input for the construction comes from Web Service based 
remote communication protocols and security solutions on top of those, mobile platform 
support for remote communications, common internet related threats and generic re-
quirements and constraints set by the Bank. These wide topics are addressed with a ra-
ther high abstraction level with occasional deep dives in to the most relevant areas. De-
cision to describe the architecture in an implementation independent level is done to 
maintain an abstraction level that enables to results to be reused in various heterogene-
ous environments. These might include for example public or private cloud, physical or 
virtual on premises servers depending on the concrete requirements and existing infra-
structure used within the implementing organization. 
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Structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 presents the general landscape around 
native mobile applications and Web Services targeted for mobile use. Chapter 2 also 
explains basic security principles and describes general requirements for the solution, 
taking in to account relevant regulation, legislation and constraints inherited from the 
existing architectural landscape in the Bank. Chapter 3 introduces and compares the 
remote communications protocols and analyses their strengths and weaknesses for mo-
bile usage, while Chapter 4 focuses on the security properties of these protocols. Chap-
ter 5 introduces the targeted mobile platforms which are going to be the service con-
sumers and describes their capabilities related to remote communications and local se-
curity features provided by the platform. Finally Chapter 6 is the construction, it de-
scribes a logical architecture for providing the secure Web Services for Mobile Applica-
tions based on the information presented in the previous chapters and maps the concerns 
and requirements presented throughout the thesis in to the final solution. The conclud-
ing chapter provides a summary explaining why RESTful services with JSON have 
been selected as the integration protocol and highlights the key building blocks of the 
security solution. 
2 Background and requirements for secure Web Services  
Smart phones are coming more and more popular; already in 2012 70% of the mobile 
phones sold in Finland have been smart phones [MVO12] and today the number is most 
likely even higher although recent statistics are not available. One of the key attractions 
of the smart phones are native mobile applications that are often tailored to provide a bit 
more limited set of functionality when compared to traditional Web applications but in a 
very user friendly and convenient way. The relatively small displays of the devices sets 
constraints to much functionality can be embedded to the screens. 
Obviously also financial institutions are eager to be able offer their services in a way 
which maximizes the user experience and convenience without tying the user to specific 
location or time to access the services. In the modern information society it is simply 
not enough for corporations to dictate in which channels their services will be available, 
but they must be able to understand and adapt to the preferred ways in which the cus-
tomers wish to interact with the services the corporations provide. 
In the context of this thesis the purpose of the mobile applications is to provide a new 
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channel to the Bank. Customers are able interact with the same business processes 
which could be alternatively reached via the existing channels such as the Internet bank-
ing portals, phone based contact centers or via the physical branch offices. The native 
applications themselves can not independently establish a channel to the bank. For the 
apps to be able to communicate to the bank some kind of online service interface is re-
quired. This service interface is the “enabler” for the mobile or any other types of appli-
cations running outside of the Bank.  
Communications between the mobile app and the Bank online service interface are the 
most sensitive parts to be protected. Security of the mobile platforms and apps running 
on those platforms is managed by the mobile operating systems leaving limited room 
for the application developers themselves to enhance security. 
Financial services provided by the Bank obviously need to be very well protected to 
maintain the trust of the consumers and also protect the Bank and the customers from 
the malicious attackers. The other way around, the Bank must also be able to trust that 
the customers are who they claim to be. In order to fulfill this requirement, strong elec-
tronic authentication is needed. The Bank operates in several European countries. All of 
the countries have different local authentication solutions. Some are directly provided 
by the Bank, some might be national “sector” solutions covering multiple financial in-
stitutions, governmental and commercial services and some of the authentication solu-
tions are provided by third party service providers. Since the aim is to have a common 
online service interface for multiple countries it must implement a pluggable authentica-
tion solution which enables the use of any of the local user authentication solutions 
without impacting the actual business services. 
Cybercrime in the internet is growing with an incredible speed as identified by Software 
Security provider McAfee [McA14]. Criminals are always keen to follow the money 
trail; wherever there is a possibility to earn money they are willing to plan cunning at-
tacks. One good example of recent attacks against the Finnish banks can be found from 
Tietoviikko magazine [Tiv12]. Tietoviikko investigates and explains a recent Man-In-
The Browser (MITB) virus epidemic that was specially customized and targeted to at-
tack the Finnish internet banking customers. Recent reports from F-Secure [FSe14] also 
indicate a significant growth for mobile viruses and trojans targeting especially the 
Google Android platform. All of this goes to show that having a high quality security 
solution is critical for a corporation that wishes to avoid direct losses and maintain a 
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good reputation among customers.  
This chapter describes the overall landscape, clarifies terms and presents common re-
quirements originating from multiple different sources. There are definite hard require-
ments originating from national and EU legislation, banking sector specific regulation, 
constraints imposed by the mobile environment. Basic security principles obviously also 
need to be adhered to. Functional requirements regarding specific services or use cases 
the application should support are left outside of the thesis except for strong authentica-
tion which is always necessary for identifying the customer. 
2.1 Native mobile applications  
Mobile applications (often referred as “mobile apps” or just “apps”) can be divided 
roughly in to three different categories based on their technological foundation. Native 
applications refer to applications developed in a specific programming language for a 
specific platform [GoS14]. Hybrid applications refer to applications where part of the 
application is platform specific code and part of the application is utilizing platform 
agnostic technologies such as HTML5 and JavaScript [GoS14]. Mobile web applica-
tions only use the Web server and Web browser to implement the application [McG11] 
just like traditional Web applications with the exception that the content is optimized for 
a smaller screen. Obviously there are significant differences in the capabilities and costs 
depending on the selected pattern.  
Native applications provide all the flexibility and performance the mobile platform has 
built in [McG11]. Then again they need to be independently developed to all selected 
mobile platforms which increases the development and maintenance cost.  
Hybrid applications enable the use of platform specific functionality but aim to provide 
the bulk of the application in a way that can be shared for all selected platforms (often 
by utilizing HTML5) [GoS14]. Hybrid approach will typically decrease the cost related 
to the applications but might not guarantee a similar level of user experience as the na-
tive approach. 
Mobile Web applications only use the browser for implementing the user interface and 
usually one implementation covers all platforms. This is a bit simplified picture, as the 
browser and JavaScript implementations differ between the platforms [McG11]. Mobile 
Web applications are the cheapest of the three. It is often possible to publish a new lay-
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out for an existing Web site to make it mobile-friendly. However the use of platform 
specific functionality is limited and the user experience is typically the lowest of the 
approach. Marketing-wise mobile Web apps lack the visibility from the online applica-
tion stores, which is available for native and hybrid applications. 
Selecting the optimal pattern of mobile applications is not a simple task; various differ-
ent aspects such as functional and non-functional requirements for the applications, ca-
pabilities of the organization and many others need to be balanced to find the appropri-
ate strategy. In this context the decision has been done previously by the Bank. The 
strategy is to develop native applications and that is the frame for the rest of the thesis. 
Situation with the selected mobile operating systems Apple iOS, Google Android and 
Microsoft Windows Phone is such that they all differ in regards to the supported pro-
gramming languages, frameworks, integration protocols and supported security features. 
This may seem like a very familiar situation for people who have been involved in de-
veloping distributed systems over the past decades. CORBA architecture and then more 
recently SOAP based Web Services have tried to provide an answer to the same exact 
problem; how to enable platform and programming language independent interoperabil-
ity for distributed systems.  
In order to avoid building separate Web Service interfaces per mobile platform or im-
plementing proprietary communication and security solutions, it is important to find the 
common nominators in terms of the supported communication protocols and messaging 
patterns. Selected mobile platforms and the common nominators are explained more 
detail in Chapter 5. 
2.2 Stateful to stateless services 
When transitioning from traditional Web applications in to native mobile applications it 
is possible to start building systems which utilize stateless Web Services. Stateless ser-
vices in general simplify development and testing of services and enable the building of 
more reliable systems [RiR07] by limiting the scope of an individual service. Stateless 
services also bring significant scalability improvements as there is no session state to be 
stored, maintained and synchronized in the server side within the Web layer. This ena-
bles the Web layer to scale horizontally [Fie00]. The Bank has a substantial user base 
and scalability is an important requirement. 
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It is essential to understand that the concept of stateless services does not mean that 
there is no state; it means that the state is not held within the Web applications. In a 
stateless service architecture state is typically stored within the actual core applications 
in the data they hold. Session related state is hold by the client application. Similarly the 
state could be managed by a Business Process Engine (BPE). BPE is responsible for 
orchestrating long running business processes where preservation of the process state is 
crucial, but the Web Services that are used to access the BPE can are still not required to 
hold an intermediate state. 
For a service to be stateless all information required for processing an individual request 
must be delivered within the request message.  This means that all messages can be pro-
cessed individually without any knowledge of the previous message exchange. It also 
means that no activities need to be coordinated between clustered servers, no state in-
formation is shared and no session affinity is needed [RiR07]. Figure 2.2 illustrates how 
the session context has been moved from server side to the client side. Moving the ses-
sion context into the client application effectively simplifies the needed architecture for 
server side session management. At the same time the move also introduces new re-
quirements for the client applications and Web Services which will be further detailed in 
the following chapters. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Simplified architecture of stateful and stateless services. On top of the picture is a traditional 
web application and on the bottom a native mobile application that utilizes stateless services. User’s 
session context is marked with a yellow star 
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In addition to the mentioned benefits, stateless services also provide new challenges. If 
all of the information needed for processing an individual request must be delivered 
within every message, message size will increase [Fie00]. Another challenge is related 
to request authentication; if each request has to be processed independently of the pre-
vious requests, it means that the authentication data must be presented with every single 
request.  
If this model is compared to how Finnish banks have commonly implemented their 
strong electronic authentication systems with the One Time Code cards (OTC) there is a 
clear gap. In the current OTC based solutions a successful user authentication generates 
a server side session and a session identifier referenced in a cookie. The cookie is sub-
sequently attached to the request message to prove that the request is part of an authen-
ticated session held by the server. To enable stateless services there is a clear need to be 
able to replace the cookie with a self-containing solution that can independently contain 
the authentication state. 
Existing One Time Code based authentication solutions are currently the corner stone of 
many Finnish services requiring strong electronic authentication (such as Finnish Social 
Insurance Institution, Finnish Tax Administration, Internet Banking portals). Other solu-
tions such as electronic ID cards and Mobile Certificate exist but are not widely used in 
Finland [Jut14]. In other Nordic countries solutions such as the Mobile Bank ID
1
 and 
hardware tokens have gained wide popularity [FIT13]. Some creative thinking is needed 
to come up with a new solution which can facilitate the use existing OTC infrastructure 
as well as support multiple other possible strong authentication solutions and still gain 
the benefits of basing the solution in stateless Web Services.  
2.3 Basic security principles 
Basic security principles in distributed systems are not tied in to the actual implementa-
tion platforms whether it is mobile, desktop or Web applications. This section introduces 
some of the basic security principles in a more generic level. Mobile app specific threats 
are detailed further in the next sections. 
Depending on the sensitivity of the data processed with the mobile applications there 
might be several different security requirements for how to arrange and protect the re-
                                                 
1
 Mobile Bank ID is a mobile application based strong electronic authentication solution used in Sweden 
and Norway. 
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mote communications and end user applications. In this study these requirements com-
monly relate to (but are not limited to) verifying the identity of the end user by using 
strong electronic authentication, protecting the integrity and confidentiality of the mes-
saging exchange, hardening the end user mobile applications and online Web Service 
interfaces. 
One fundamental security concept is Authentication, Authorization and Accounting 
[PaS09] often referred as AAA. This concept is typically applied in almost all systems 
that are processing sensitive data and which need a mechanism for limiting the access to 
the system. 
Authentication refers to verifying the identity of the requester of a service [Dec09]. The 
mechanism for authenticating the identity of a subject typically falls in to one of three 
categories. In the context of electronic authentication these categories are often referred 
as factors. The number of factors used for authenticating corresponds how strong or 
reliable the authentication is. 
The possible factors are [Fin14]: 
1. Something that only you know. This can be a user-id, password, PIN code or 
some other information that only you should know. 
2. Something that only you possess. This can be a credit card, an OTC list, a hard-
ware security token, an electronic id card or even a previously registered mobile 
device (this is elaborated further in Chapter 6). 
3. Something unique that you are. Finger prints, iris, DNA, voice or key board tap-
ping pattern for example. 
When two or more authentication factors are combined within the authentication pro-
cess, the authentication mechanism can be considered to belong to the category of 
strong electronic authentication [Fin14]. 
Authorization refers to the process of verifying that the requestor of a service has the 
permission to consume the requested service [Dec09]. Authorization is performed after 
authentication after the identity of the requestor has been verified. There is also a need 
for default policy for the non-authenticated user. Default policy might simply state that 
all other services, except the authentication service, are disallowed for the non-
authenticated user.  
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Accounting refers to an audit trail or a log file indicating the exact actions that have 
been taken by the customer [Dec09] and the outcomes of those actions. Detailed audit 
trail enables traversing back in time for example in the case of a dispute to clarify the 
exact steps and actions taken within a business process. 
To illustrate what AAA means in practice, an example of a customer withdrawing mon-
ey from an ATM machine with his credit/debit card is used. The process starts with au-
thentication when the customer enters his credit card in to the ATM and enters the relat-
ed PIN code. This is obviously two-factor authentication; something that the user pos-
sesses (the credit card) and something that the user knows (PIN code of the card).  
Second step is authorization, it is not possible withdraw money from any account in the 
bank, but only from the accounts that you are authorized to use. To be more specific 
only from the account that is associated with the specific card being used. Authorization 
needs to happen with every single action be it withdrawal or just viewing the balance. 
Since it occurs behind the user interface it might feel too obvious even to think about. 
Authorization is often divided in to two categories, coarse grained and fine grained. 
Coarse grained authorization might refer to a less detailed list of which accounts the 
customer has in his/her control and fine grained authorization refers to the actions the 
customer is allowed to execute for a specific account. For example view only, deposit or 
withdraw money. 
Accounting can not be seen as an individual step in the withdrawal process. It happens 
continuously in parallel with every single step that the customer takes starting from reg-
istering the card that has been entered to the ATM. When the process is completed the 
Bank will have a complete audit trail of the events that occurred. These events include 
the location where the customer used the ATM, the time when did he/she use it, which 
actions the customer took and what where the results of those actions. Final entry in the 
audit log describes when did the customer terminate the session at the ATM and picked 
out his card and the money. The bank will store this information for the coming years 
according to its accounting policy to be able to prove the exact steps which occurred in 
case there would ever be a dispute of how much money was withdrawn and by whom. 
The described security principles also apply to services used by mobile applications. In 
addition to the principles mentioned above, there are extra requirements caused by the 
nature of open internet; most importantly message integrity and message confidentiality. 
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Message integrity means that the integrity of the messages is guaranteed and preserved 
[Lad11]. After the message author has created the message there is no way an attacker 
could alter the message in such a way that it would not be detectable for the message 
receiver. Typical means for implementing message integrity contain Hashed Message 
Authentication Codes (HMAC) with symmetric keys and PKI based digital signatures 
with asymmetric key pairs. Signatures and HMACs can be created various different 
cryptographic algorithms. HMACs and digital signatures are elaborated in more detail 
in the following chapters. 
Message confidentiality means that the message content is not revealed to anyone else 
than to the sender and receiver [Lad11]. This can be achieved by encrypting the messag-
ing exchange. Encryption can occur in the transport layer via the use of Transport Layer 
Security (TLS, often also referred as SSL) or in the messaging layer with the use of a of 
message level encryption scheme. Difference between message and transport level pro-
tection is elaborated further in Chapter 4. 
In the context of security principles for mobile Web Services it is important to distin-
guish two authentication related concepts which closely relate to each other; user au-
thentication and request authentication. User authentication refers to verifying the iden-
tity of the actual end user based on a set of credentials provided by the user. Request 
authentication refers to authenticating the individual request to verify that it belongs to 
an authenticated session. The authenticated session must have been initiated by the end 
user by performing user authentication. Certain Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based 
security mechanisms such as digital signatures asymmetric keys or SSL mutual authen-
tication combine user and request authentication. This means that the user actually pro-
vides his/her identity with every single request. Such an approach effectively removes 
the need for maintaining any kind of sessions from security perspective. 
2.4 Mobile security and general threats to be mitigated 
As with any type of applications which are targeted for public use over the internet, also 
the native mobile applications are under a myriad of different kind of threats. These 
threats are targeted to all layers of the overall infrastructure. Open Web Application Se-
curity Project (OWASP) has a dedicated section for mobile application security and they 
list the current top 10 risks. 
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OWASP top 10 Mobile risks [OWA14]: 
    M1: Weak Server Side Controls 
    M2: Insecure Data Storage 
    M3: Insufficient Transport Layer Protection 
    M4: Unintended Data Leakage 
    M5: Poor Authorization and Authentication 
    M6: Broken Cryptography 
    M7: Client Side Injection 
    M8: Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs 
    M9: Improper Session Handling 
    M10: Lack of Binary Protections  
Further details of the individual risks can be found from the OWASP Web site. From the 
list it is obvious that top 10 entries contain risks of various types. The risks are related to 
how the actual mobile applications are implemented and secured, how the transport lay-
er to the services is protected and also what kind of security controls are in place behind 
the Web Service interface. This thesis and the security solutions presented in later chap-
ters are primarily focusing on the transport layer, message exchange and the server side 
controls. The actual native mobile applications and mobile platform security features are 
not the main focus of this document and only light weight introduction will be provided. 
Latest information regarding the constantly changing threat landscape can be found 
from the Internet security providers and cybercrime prevention companies’ blogs. 
Recent sophisticated virus attacks such as the Stuxnet [Sym10] have efficiently illus-
trated that there is no such thing as an un-penetrable IT system. It is possible to pene-
trate every single system connected to the internet and even the ones which are not. If 
enough will and resources are put on to the task there will be a way in to any system. 
With the revelations from Edward Snowden [Gua13] concerns have risen towards some 
of the fundamental structures of World Wide Web. If governmental organizations have 
the possibility to tap in to all internet traffic it is only a matter of time before cybercrim-
inals will start to have the similar capabilities. 
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Banks have received their share of fairly advanced attacks. There are for example al-
ready viruses targeted against specific banks which will contaminate user’s mobile 
phone when connected to the infected PC [FiR11]. After contaminating the device the 
attacker waits for the victim to log in to the internet banking portal to steal the custom-
er’s session. Even if the bank has a risk engine2 that might request an “out of band” con-
firmation by SMS in case of a suspicious transaction, the virus in the mobile phone will 
hide the received SMS and answer behalf of the user to confirm the forged transaction 
[Tec12]. Just to show how clever the attackers are, there are several variations for this 
attack. In one of them a modified version of the trojan changes the customers phone 
number within the Internet banking portal so that the confirmation message is delivered 
to a device possessed by the attacker. Another version is a Man-In-The-Browser (MITB) 
attack where the attacker displays forged content in the browser. The customer is made 
to believe that the bank is requesting the customer to make a test confirmation to make 
sure that bank has the correct phone number. Actually the attacker has performed a fi-
nancial transaction on the background and the user confirms real money to be trans-
ferred out of his account [IBM12]. 
Even the PKI based signature and encryption mechanisms, which are generally regarded 
as being very secure, have several vulnerabilities as identified by Patel, Mohandes et al. 
in their paper “Attacks on Web Services and mitigation schemes” [PMP10]. Further-
more, Open SSL that is one of the most popular Open Source SSL libraries used, was 
found to contain multiple critical security vulnerabilities [CVE14]. The code for Open 
SSL is open source and has been open for peer reviews for several years. All of this 
goes to show that it is crucial to be prepared for major changes in the threat landscape 
and to have solid mitigation plans to ensure business continuity.  
The aim of an organization planning to develop mobile applications for financial trans-
actions should not be to create a system which is impossible to penetrate. A more realis-
tic approach is to evaluate the risk level of the services provided, define the risk toler-
ance of the company and decide to invest in to the security solutions accordingly. An-
other a bit more simplified view is to create a system which is significantly more diffi-
cult to penetrate than the other competing systems on the market. Most of the cyber-
                                                 
2
 Risk engines (also referred as “transaction risk scoring engines”) are commonly used by banks to 
analyze money bearing transactions to profile and score risk level of the transaction based on various 
properties. High risk transactions might be stopped or require an extra confirmation from the user. 
14 
criminals work like any enterprises; they are after return for their investment. If it takes 
five times more time to attack a certain online system than another, most of the focus 
will be on the system which requires the least time to penetrate. As identified by the 
security vendor McAfee, the criminals want to get maximum financial benefit with the 
least possible effort and minimal risk of getting caught [McA14]. 
It is good to remember that decreased usability is one of the common tradeoffs for in-
creased security [BKS11]. The more security controls are built and authentication fac-
tors are used, the more cumbersome it will be for the user to use the system. This is es-
pecially relevant for the native applications. One of the driving forces for the “app revo-
lution” has been the excellent usability and optimal user experience of the native appli-
cations when compared to traditional mobile Web applications.  
The most important thing is to acknowledge and understand the risks and to find a bal-
ance between security and usability. In practice it means taking a calculated risk; as long 
as that risk is small enough and acknowledged and accepted there is nothing wrong with 
that. 
2.5 Relevant legislation and regulation 
Publishing mobile applications which use strong electronic authentication and offer fi-
nancial services such as payments or card related functionality is regulated in several 
ways. There is EU wide legislation, local legislation, sector specific regulation from the 
central organizations and security standards from commercial card providers such as 
Visa and MasterCard. This section briefly introduces some of the related regulation 
which is relevant in the context of this paper. 
EU directive 1999/93/EC describes an overall framework for electronic identification 
[EUR14a]. The Finnish interpretation from the directive is the Electronic Identification 
Act 7.8.2009/617; it defines requirements for strong electronic identification [Fin14].  
The basic principle of the directive is the same that was described previously in Section 
2.2. For an electronic authentication method to be considered strong it has to utilize at 
least two out of three identification requirements (factors) as explained in Section 2.2. 
The law also makes a distinction between an “electronic signature” and a “developed 
electronic signature”. First one refers to generic strong authentication solutions for ex-
ample with traditional one time codes and the latter one refers to PKI based digital sig-
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natures which so far have not gained a strong foothold in Finland.  
A pre-requirement for issuing strong identification credentials to an individual is the so 
called “first meeting”. This means that the individual has to be come to a physical office 
to identify himself face to face by using an official identification document such as a 
valid passport. Similar regulation applies towards the financial institutions for other 
reasons (Anti Money Laundering, Financing of terrorism). Banks must know their cus-
tomers (Know Your Customer, KYC) before establishing a business relationship. This is 
one of the reasons why Finnish banks have naturally adapted the role of an identity pro-
vider in the Finnish market for e-commerce services. 
Strong electronic identification enables the customer and service provider to make le-
gally binding agreements. To provide Web or mobile based applications that can be used 
for executing financial transactions or to create new agreements, financial institutions 
need to identify the customers by using strong electronic authentication. 
Other relevant legislation which has an impact regarding native applications is the Data 
Protection Directive. It defines how sensitive personal information can be gathered, 
processed and how it must be protected [EUR14a]. The Data Protection Directive is 
extensive and has several implications for almost any type of businesses; in the context 
this paper the most relevant part is the requirement to securely store any data collected 
and protect it from abuse. 
All European banks are subject to the regulation of European Central Bank (ECB). The 
main focus of the regulation is in the actual banking business and the goals are to in-
crease competition, harmonize consumer protection and to protect stability of banking 
systems in the European area. However ECB has also released a recommendation called 
“Recommendation for the security of internet payments”. This recommendation goes 
quite far in detail regarding what kind of protection European banking organizations 
shall have in place for “Internet payments” (referring to any type of internet originating 
payments, whether Web or Mobile App based). Key points from ECB “Recommenda-
tion for the security of internet payments” [ECB13] are the following: 
 Protect the initiation of internet payments, as well as access to sensitive payment 
data, by using strong customer authentication. 
 Limit the number of log-in or authentication attempts, define rules for internet 
payment services session “time out” and set time limits for the validity of au-
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thentication. 
 Establish a transaction monitoring mechanisms designed to prevent, detect and 
block fraudulent payment transactions. 
 Implement multiple layers of security defense in order to mitigate identified 
risks. 
 Provide assistance and guidance to customers regarding online security best 
practices, set up alerts and provide tools to help customers to monitor transac-
tions. 
Further regulation applies to all applications which handle debit, credit, ATM and Point 
Of Sales cards. Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) governs how 
card related information can be processed, displayed and how it must be protected in 
different usage scenarios [PCI13]. 
As explained in this chapter, in the banking industry it is simply not enough to build 
secure services and secure mobile applications, these applications must also adhere to 
extensive regulation and local legislation. A common best practice is to involve appro-
priate subject matter experts such as an external auditors and the legal department to 
verify that these obligations have been fulfilled. 
2.6 Other constraints and requirements 
It is important to remember that the new mobile channel is designed in to a specific con-
text. There are a number of existing constraints, requirements and preconditions that 
influence the design decisions taken later in the thesis. 
The constraints in no specific order are the following: 
 The constraints for mobile devices include limited processing power (CPU), lim-
ited memory, limited battery capacity, limited network connectivity in terms of 
bandwidth and availability (including switching between networks) and latency, 
limited features provided by the run time platform, fragmented run time plat-
forms as well as hardware platforms containing different features and capabili-
ties. 
 Suggested solution must fit within the existing AS-IS enterprise architecture 
landscape described in Figure 2.9. The landscape should be extended with mo-
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bile related needs and capabilities. 
 Needed business services and core systems (including the data) exist, and there 
shouldn’t be a need to be modified those for adding a new channel. New sup-
porting services might be needed. 
 Existing user authentication solutions must be utilized within the applications. It 
should be possible to support several different authentication mechanisms (such 
as one time codes, password based, mobile app/sim based). Adding or removing 
of an authentication solution should not impact or require a redesign for the se-
curity solution. 
 Internal SOA service layer exists to expose the needed interfaces from the core 
business systems. Whether the core services reside on legacy mainframe plat-
forms or more modern runtime environments is not significant. 
 The bank provides majority of the core business services as a single entity, ex-
cluding the need for a federated authentication solution. 
 No replication of the data for mobile needs i.e. no secondary copies of the cus-
tomer registry or any other data. This is to ensure consistency of the data and to 
adhere to SOA principles and keep ownership of data clear. 
 Constraints imposed by the mobile platform providers related to how mobile 
apps can be developed, distributed and maintained. Further details regarding de-
velopment, distribution and maintenance of the apps is elaborated in chapter 5. 
 
These constraints make it clear that this work can not be seen as greenfield development 
but as more of a specific solution for large companies which typically have large num-
ber of existing systems and legacy solutions.  
Figure 2.6 presents the existing architectural landscape in which the new mobile chan-
nel must be fitted in. It also visualizes what is meant by different communication and 
distribution channels accessing the shared core business functionalities. 
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Figure 2.6 High level architecture. The Core Business Applications, SOA service layer and channel 
applications which are responsible for adapting and securing the data to be used in a specific channel are 
clearly separated. Rectangle with red dashed line highlights the focus area of this thesis. 
 
Purpose of the channel based approach is to decouple different layers, keep clear owner-
ship and enable the reuse of core business functions across the channels. If a customer 
wants to perform a payment it can be done by visiting a physical branch office, calling 
in to Contact Centre, logging in to the Mobile or Web based Netbank or by using the 
physical Payment ATM machines. In all cases it the payment will be processed and exe-
cuted by the centralized Payment core systems. If the Bank decides to replace one of the 
core systems, ideally it will have a minimal impact on the channels since SOA Service 
layer provides a generic interface to the core systems hiding their implementation spe-
cific details. 
3 Selecting the appropriate type of Web Services for 
mobile consumers 
Web Service is a general term describing system to system communications over the 
Web. A common goal for Web Services is to provide interoperable messaging between 
different software applications running on different platforms [Boo04]. While almost 
any HTTP based service could be referred as a Web Service, in this context a Web Ser-
vice refers either to RESTful Web Service or a SOAP based Web Service. Differences 
and the special characteristics of these two Web Service types are explained in this 
chapter. 
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Various attempts have been made for defining and building an interoperable integration 
protocol to suit the need of distributed systems. First there was Remote Procedure Calls 
(RPC), then Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) and after that 
came Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM), Java Remote Method Invocations 
(RMI) and finally SOAP based Web Services which use XML for the message ex-
change. In the modern client-server world HTTP is the natural transport protocol. It is 
widely supported in different platforms and it is the foundation of the World Wide Web. 
On top of this foundation has born the concept of RESTful Web Services. RESTful Web 
Services are not the result of huge corporations setting up big design and standardiza-
tion committees which is the case for SOAP. REST is more of a conceptual or an archi-
tectural pattern which has grown organically based on the fundamental Internet archi-
tecture. Roy Fielding, one of the key contributors to the original HTTP specification, 
initially introduced the concept [Fie00] of REST in his doctoral dissertation. 
A case study conducted in 2012 by Vitmar, Vinoski and Pautasso focusing on program-
matic Web interfaces reveals the popularity of RESTful Web Services [VVP12]. Ac-
cording to the statistics the researchers acquired from programmableweb.com
3
 in 2011 
75% of the online interfaces were REST based and less than 25% SOAP based. Similar 
trend can be observed from stackoverflow.com that is one of the largest online discus-
sion and question boards for all types of programming related questions. As of 
9.12.2014 there are 28490 REST related questions in stackoverflow.com which corre-
sponds to ~66% of the total SOAP and REST related questions, versus 14755 SOAP 
related questions (~34%).  
There are no definitive figures of how much SOAP or REST is globally used since ma-
jority of corporations are not willing to expose any details regarding the numbers of 
internal or private API:s. However it is rather clear that REST is the current favorite. 
While the selection of an integration protocol is not a popularity contents, there are im-
plications that should be taken into consideration such as the availability of developers 
and livelihood of the developer community around the specification, toolsets, and 
frameworks impacting availability of long term support. 
This chapter introduces three different types of Web Services; SOAP based, RESTful 
with JSON as the content type and RESTful with XML as the content type and analyzes 
                                                 
3
 programmableweb.com is a large online repository for listing open interfaces 
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their strengths and weaknesses for mobile use. The last section of the chapter makes an 
initial recommendation for selecting the integration protocol based on the information 
presented so far. 
3.1 SOAP based Web Services 
SOAP is an acronym originally for Simple Object Access Protocol; later on it has com-
monly also been used for Service Oriented Architecture Protocol [Boo04]. To be specif-
ic SOAP is a World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) standard defining how to exchange 
XML based messages between systems [Mit07]. Another important standard related to 
SOAP is Web Services Description Language (WSDL) [ChM07]. WSDL is used for the 
describing the interface of the SOAP based services. Both SOAP and WSDL are based 
on the fundamental XML, XML Schema and XML namespace specifications.  
As described, SOAP is based on a stack of standards. It is supported on a wide variety 
of operating systems and programming languages. While the SOAP specification and 
other related standards such as Web Services Interoperability Basic Profile (WS-I BP), 
aim for interoperability, the SOAP critics are saying that it is too complex, requires 
heavy processing and that the promise of interoperability has not been fulfilled 
[PZL08].  
SOAP based Web Services are agnostic regarding the transport protocol. Messages can 
be transferred for example over HTTP, SMTP, FTP, MQ and JMS. Fundamentally the 
request and response messages will contain all required information which is needed for 
processing them. This enables the services to be stateless. Even if HTTP(s) is the most 
commonly used transport protocol for SOAP based implementations, the fact that only 
HTTP POST method is supported means that SOAP is not really adhering to the funda-
mental Web architecture. The use of a single HTTP method for example breaks protocol 
level caching as HTTP POST should be used for non-idempotent requests and non-
idempotent requests should not be cached. Some also claim that SOAP based services 
are too slow to develop to satisfy the modern rapid time to market cycle. Time to market 
is especially in the mobile industry where things change rapidly. 
SOAP specification describes a mandatory high level XML message structure for any 
SOAP based web service. The standard message structure contains a top level element 
called Envelope; inside the envelope are the optional Header and mandatory Body ele-
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ments as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Detailed message content inside the Header and Body 
elements and the interface between the service consumer and the service provider is 
defined in the machine readable interface description, WSDL. WSDL defines detailed 
information about supported operations that belong to a specific service. It also contains 
the request and response message structures which are expected and the end point ad-
dresses where the messages must be sent [Boo04]. 
 
Figure 3.1 SOAP Envelope 
Purpose of the optional header element is to contain metadata related to the request or 
response which can be processed by intermediate nodes in the SOAP message exchange 
before the ultimate SOAP receiver. Metadata in this case refers to data which is not nec-
essarily directly related to the actual payload or business content of the request, but is 
still necessary to be embedded in to the message. SOAP Header can contain security, 
routing or service level related information as specified in the several of so called WS-* 
specifications such as WS-Security, WS-Addressing and WS-ReliableMessaging 
[PZL08]. These specifications build on top of the SOAP specification similarly as 
SOAP builds on top of the XML specification.  
SOAP Body contains the actual payload of the request or response message and is tar-
geted for the ultimate SOAP receiver. In a simple bookstore service example we could 
have an operation called “getBookDetails”. The request message for the operation could 
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be an XML structure containing the ISBN number of a book and the response message 
would contain an XML structure containing all the relevant details like the name of the 
book, author, publishing date and the publisher of the requested book.  
SOAP Body must be defined in the WSDL but this is not required for the SOAP Header. 
Continuing with the bookstore example, the WSDL would contain the description of the 
“getBookDetails” operation with the associated request and response types. The WSDL 
will also contain the exact data type definitions for the request and response messages. 
Also names of the individual fields, namespaces, exact data types, ordering of the ele-
ments and information regarding whether they are mandatory or optional is included. 
WSDL supports embedded XML schema or references to external XML schema files 
for defining the message format. Referencing to external schemas is a useful feature if 
the commonly used data types of an organization have been previously been described. 
The use of external schemas enable re-use for the data types between services that uti-
lize the same fundamental data types. Use of XML schema enables SOAP messages to 
be schema validated to verify that they are correctly formatted and can successfully in-
terpreted by the sender and receiver [PMP10]. Schema validation eases the development 
efforts as it simple to pinpoint if it was the sending or receiving party who didn’t format 
the message according to the previously made agreement described in the WSDL.  
Disadvantages of SOAP based services include verbose messages that increase the size 
of the message exchange. Parsing of the XML messages in the mobile devices is fairly 
slow and resource consuming [GiT11]. The SOAP specification in general is rather 
complex and requires in depth knowledge from the developers. Complexity also sets 
requirements for tooling, it is a huge effort to use SOAP with the platform primitives 
(HTTP client and XML parser) if designated libraries are not available. 
3.2 RESTful Web Services 
REST which is short for Representational State Transfer is a term introduced by Roy 
Fielding in his famous doctoral dissertation from the year 2000 [Fie00]. REST is not a 
standard or a specification but a set of architectural principles which enables building of 
scalable distributed applications [PZL08]. RESTful services are focused on addressing 
the resources of a system via Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI). Resource states can 
be managed over HTTP by client applications written in many different programming 
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languages as long as they contain support for the basic HTTP standard. 
Typically a resource representation will reflect the current state of a resource and its 
attributes at the time when a client application requests it [RiR07]. Resource representa-
tion in this sense is only a snapshot at specific moment time. This resource representa-
tion could be for example a record in a database, an image or document in a file system 
or a detailed part of a domain specific data model. 
The structure of a RESTful request/response message is divided in to three independent 
sections as described in the HTTP specification; [Fie99] 1) HTTP headers contain oper-
ation related parameters and additional metadata 2) URI which identifies the resource to 
be operated and 3) optional payload which contains the actual data related to the request 
or response. 
RESTful services were introduced only two years later than SOAP based Web Services. 
The concept is not new but REST has really gained momentum in the last couple of 
years [VVP12]. One likely reason is that more and more developers have become frus-
trated with the complexity of SOAP and the general mismatch between SOAP and 
HTTP protocol. Big online vendors like Google, Facebook, Amazon and Twitter are 
primarily focusing on RESTful services for providing their online API:s.  
RESTful Web Services are tightly bound to the use of HTTP as the communication pro-
tocol. HTTP verbs GET, POST, PUT and DELETE are most commonly used to indicate 
what kind of operation is to be performed for the selected resource [Fie99]. The re-
source to be operated is identified by the URI [RiR07]. Additional HTTP methods 
(CONNECT, HEAD, OPTIONS, PATCH, TRACE) exist but they have not gained a 
wide usage within the RESTful context. 
Basic usage of the HTTP verbs is the following [Fie99]: 
 To retrieve a resource, use GET. 
 To create a resource on the server or to initiate server side data-processing, use 
POST. 
 To change the state of a resource or to update it, use PUT. 
 To remove or delete a resource, use DELETE.  
Nature of the different HTTP methods means that for some operations there is no re-
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quest payload, since all the relevant information is included the HTTP method and re-
quest URI. Using the previously mentioned bookstore service as a RESTful version, 
requesting the information related to a book with an ISBN number ISBN123456 from 
the bookstore service could be done by issuing the following HTTP request:                
HTTP GET www.bookstore.com/books/ISBN123456.  
Comparing this request to a corresponding SOAP request reveals the simplicity and 
minimal request size of RESTful read only operations. The SOAP based request would 
also have a specific URI for the operation and specific XML based request message 
structure embedded in a SOAP envelope. 
RESTful Web Services are agnostic to the message format used. Typically the supported 
content types are predefined and the client can attach a specific Accept HTTP header to 
the request to indicate the desired content type. Two popular messaging formats used 
with RESTful Web Services are XML and JavaScript Object Notation (JSON). Usage of 
XML and JSON based messages and their specific characteristics are explained in more 
detail in the following sub-sections. 
RESTful services typically rely heavily on standard HTTP status codes. HTTP 200 is 
used for OK response; HTTP 500 indicates an internal error inside the service while 
HTTP 400 indicates that request sent by the client was malformed. HTTP status codes 
are also used for example for redirecting, indicating caching related information and for 
various other purposes [Fie99]. Benefit of the standard status codes is that common in-
ternet based infrastructure can interpret these codes and act accordingly when needed 
[Fie00]. 
Resource oriented nature of REST also causes some interesting questions which are not 
widely discussed in the relevant literature. For example can everything be modelled as 
resources? Concrete data like the bookstore related examples above are easy to identify 
as resources. But modelling actions in to resources is already a bit more challenging. 
For example; how to model an authentication, payment or a chain of actions i.e. a long 
running business process as a resource?  
Experience from working with RESTful services within a complex IT environment 
shows that it is not always feasible to expose the concrete data structures as resources. A 
popular approach is to increase the level of abstraction and provide a high level REST-
ful facades, which can for example hide the transactional needs (or associated business 
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logic) related to the resources.  
Using a payment between two accounts as an example; it is not feasible to open up di-
rect access to account ledgers as RESTful resources and trust the service consumer to 
guarantee transactionality. The consumer might fail to make the required bookings on 
both accounts when transferring money from account to another. Better approach would 
be to build some kind of top level transaction which will always provide expected out-
come. This top level transaction which is responsible for performing several activities 
can hardly be described as a resource. Certain level of abstraction is needed in order to 
model the real world in to RESTful resources that are convenient to use. 
Disadvantages of using RESTful services as the integration pattern commonly relate to 
the abstract level of the architectural pattern. There are several interpretations of what it 
takes for a service to be truly RESTful. REST is also lacking the mature tool set of 
based on standards which have developed around SOAP. There is no formal interface 
description language, message level security specifications, transaction support nor reli-
able messaging.  
3.2.1 XML based RESTful Web Services 
SOAP based Web Services and the general interest towards XML in the early 2000’s 
have been the major influencers for starting to use XML as a message structure with 
RESTful services [RiR07]. XML based RESTful services are still used and many 
RESTful services offer both JSON and XML based content types but the general trend 
is leaning more towards JSON. 
Benefit of using XML as the messaging protocol are the mature standards around XML. 
XML namespaces can be for example used to specify the context of an “Amount” field. 
In some context it could refer to the amount received and in another context amount 
paid. Also the XML related security standards can be used to protect the message con-
tent in the cases when an actual message payload exists in addition to the HTTP method 
and URI.  
Disadvantages XML based messaging include increased message size and increased 
CPU consumption for parsing of the messages both in client and server [GiT11].     
26 
3.2.2 JSON based RESTful Web Services 
As defined in json.org, “JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) is a lightweight data-
interchange format”. JSON is based on a subset of the JavaScript (ECMA-262) stand-
ard. It is programming language agnostic and utilizes name-value pairs and lists of 
name-value pairs as the primary data structures. These universal data structures can be 
found from almost all programming languages making it simple to utilize JSON in het-
erogeneous programming language environments. 
Typically many modern Web applications have the requirement of integrating the user 
interface in to the back end services to show dynamic content. This has been one of the 
driving forces of using JSON based messages over RESTful services. JSON is the natu-
ral way of passing data to JavaScript functions that are commonly used to render asyn-
chronous content to modern Web 2.0 Web applications. JSON as such in not bound to 
RESTful services, but it is a general purpose data exchange format. 
Current trend is favoring JSON based RESTful services since they are seen as a simple 
and lightweight option for XML based messaging. Indeed the JSON syntax provides 
smaller message size [HFP11] and is faster to parse by the sender and receiver and con-
sumes less battery from the mobile device as proven by measurements done by Bruno 
Gil and Paulo Trezentos [GiT11]. The trade-off for the convenience and good perfor-
mance is in the lack of mature JSON related standards that exist in the XML world 
[Ser12]. Decreased message size along with decreased CPU and memory usage are fac-
tors that clearly make JSON the optimal candidate as the message syntax to be used in a 
mobile environment. 
3.3 Comparing the features of SOAP based and RESTful Web Services 
Different features and properties of the presented integration protocols are gathered in to 
Table 3.3 to enable comparison feature by feature and to ease the protocol selection pro-
cess. The table can be used to analyze the tradeoffs associated with the selection of the 
integration protocol. 
So far the security features of the integration protocols or the capabilities of the selected 
mobile platforms have not been presented yet. They are still both important factors in 
selecting of the optimal integration protocol so they are included in the table. Security 
features of the integration protocols are presented in Chapter 4 and support for the 
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SOAP based and RESTful services in the modern mobile device platforms is analyzed 
in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Capability SOAP based 
Web Services 
RESTful Web 
Services 
Additional comments 
Multiple transport pro-
tocols 
x - Not extremely relevant if 
the services are targeted 
only for mobile usage 
since HTTP is the de-facto 
transport protocol. 
Standard transport lay-
er security 
x x SSL when using HTTP, 
additional mechanisms 
available when using 
SOAP with other transport 
protocols. 
Multiple messaging 
formats 
-  x  
Standard interface des-
cription language avai-
lable 
x -[*] [*] WADL and some tool 
specific description lan-
guages exist in the REST-
ful context, but none of 
them have gained wide 
acceptance. 
Standardized message 
level security 
x - Elaborated in more detail 
in chapter 4. 
Standardized support 
for transactions 
x -  
Support for reliable 
messaging 
x -  
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Capability SOAP based 
Web Services 
RESTful Web 
Services 
Additional comments 
Smallest message size 
(less bandwidth used) 
- x HTTP compression can 
decrease the gap, but still 
RESTful messages will 
have less overhead 
Less CPU consuming 
parsing/processing 
(better battery life in 
mobile) 
- x  
Native support in mo-
bile platform API:s 
- x Elaborated in more detail 
in chapter 5. 
Active developer 
community in the mo-
bile context 
- x  
Table 3.3 Comparison of capabilities and features between SOAP and RESTful Web Services 
 
Table 3.3 gathers the properties, features and capabilities of SOAP and REST based 
Web Services and provides some information about the possible trade-offs of each pat-
tern. For example if message level security is a must requirement, then SOAP is the 
only pattern supporting that. The tradeoff is that there is no native support in the mobile 
platform API:s for SOAP. Or vice versa, if multiple messaging formats is the key re-
quirement, then the tradeoff is that only one transport protocol is available, as SOAP 
can not be used. 
Pautasso, Zimmerman et al have done a similar comparison without the mobile aspect. 
Their conclusion is that SOAP based services are better suited for professional enter-
prise application integration scenarios while REST is more suited for tactical ad hoc 
integration over the Web [PZL08]. When the results are combined with the mobile as-
pects such as message size, native support in mobile platforms and battery consumption, 
RESTful services start to seem even more appealing for integrations over the Web, let it 
be for tactical or strategic purposes. 
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Selecting the appropriate integration pattern should be based on the actual requirements 
of the system that is being built. The relevancy and importance of the capabilities and 
features listed will most likely differ per organization or possibly even between different 
systems within in the same organization. If Table 3.3 is to be used as a reference for 
decision making, the decision makers should weigh the different capabilities according 
to their specific needs and requirements. Security related aspects and support in the se-
lected mobile platforms will be described in more detail in the following Chapter 4. 
3.4 Recommended pattern for Mobile use 
Taking in consideration the mobile related constraints presented in chapter 2.6 and the 
descriptions of SOAP and RESTful services in this chapter, the conclusion is that 
RESTful Web Services with JSON are best suited for the mobile usage. Smaller mes-
sage size, decreased battery usage and the fact that JSON is recognized as a native data 
type requiring less heavy processing in the mobile platforms are technical facts in favor 
of RESTful Web Services.  
RESTful Web Services have achieved sort of a de-facto status for internet based solu-
tions. Even if one could say SOAP is much more mature and comprehensive specifica-
tion when comparing them feature/capability wise. This de-facto status means that the 
REST is the skillset that is going to be available in the developer market. Looking in to 
the future RESTful Web Services is the technology which is going to have the more 
active development community. Future incremental development steps in the integration 
protocols are most likely going to be based on the REST ideology until someone comes 
up with a revolutionary idea that offers a completely new alternative. 
This recommendation will be updated in the coming chapters regarding security features 
and features found from the mobile operating systems. 
4 Security features of SOAP based and RESTful Web 
Services 
RESTful and SOAP based Web Services differ significantly in terms of the security 
standards and features available. SOAP has several mature standardized security exten-
sions while RESTful Web Services mostly rely on best practices and implementation 
and vendor specific solutions. 
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WS-Security is the de-facto security framework to be used with SOAP [Law06]. WS-
Security builds on top of XML digital signature (XMLDSIG) and XML encryption 
(XMLENC) standards that are the fundamental building blocks of XML based digital 
signatures and encryption [Law06]. Several other even more evolved security specifica-
tions have been developed on top of WS-Security. These include WS-Trust, WS-
SecureConversation and WS-SecurityPolicy as described in Figure 4. These extensions 
are targeted for specific use cases which are not relevant in the context of this thesis. 
 
WS-SecurityPolicy 
WS-SecureConversation 
WS-Trust 
WS-Security 
SOAP XML Signature XML Encryption 
XML 
Figure 4 describes the relation between XML and SOAP related standards.  
 
RESTful Web Services with JSON are security-wise in a completely different situation 
compared to SOAP. As JSON and XML differ feature-wise it is impossible directly uti-
lize any of the existing XML security features with JSON. XML contains attributes, 
object references and data types which are used in WS-Security. The basic principles of 
public key cryptography that are behind the XML security standards could be utilized 
for JSON based services. That would however require significant standardization ef-
forts. Additional challenge comes from the nature of REST as explained in the previous 
chapter. The request or response related data might be divided in to several parts of the 
HTTP message including headers, URI and the JSON payload. A protection only cover-
ing the JSON body would not be sufficient. 
One security solution that is available for both Web Service types is Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) also commonly referred as SSL or HTTPS [Ser12]. Basic TLS provides 
encryption of the message exchange and identification of the service provider. Optional-
ly authentication of the service requestor can be achieved in the so called mutual au-
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thentication scenario, where the client also holds a dedicated certificate [DiR08]. One 
could argue that SSL should be a sufficient solution for Web Services based systems, 
since currently SSL is still one of the security cornerstones of most of the Web based 
solutions. While this claim is true for SSL being the widely used by current Web appli-
cations, it is not a very future-proof approach. When building new architecture for a 
system which is expected to have a long lifecycle, it should at least include the capabil-
ity of adding new security features later on as needed, if not included right away from 
the beginning. Most important areas for improvements would be message level encryp-
tion and message level signatures, which can protect the message exchange even if the 
protection provided by transport protocol is compromised.  
Having SSL as the only primary mean for protecting the communications is an in-
creased operational risk, and an approach that should be avoided with business critical 
systems. One critical bug in the SSL libraries can completely destroy the security of the 
system and require services to be completely halted, as was seen with the Heartbleed 
vulnerability in April 2014 [CVE14]. 
Rest of this chapter focuses on introducing and comparing the details of available secu-
rity solutions for SOAP and RESTful Web Services. In the end of the chapter there is a 
recommendation for the security solution building on top of the recommendation from 
Chapter 3. 
4.1 Security of SOAP based Web Services 
SOAP based Web Services can be secured either via transport layer security (SSL) or 
WS-Security based standards. Fundamental difference of these mechanisms is that WS-
Security provides end-to-end message level security while transport level security such 
as SSL or a VPN only offers point-to-point security. Point-to-point security means that 
the message is protected only between the two immediate nodes which communicate 
directly with each other, possibly leaving the messages vulnerable in the intermediate 
nodes as displayed in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 Point-to-Point and message level security. SSL or other point to point transport layer security 
is broken in the intermediary node which will have the possibility to read or modify the message. Message 
level WS-Security guarantees end-to-end security in the entire processing chain. Green envelope presents 
message being safe and red envelope indicating message being vulnerable. 
 
End-to-end message level security means that the request and response messages con-
tain all the security related information and protection. It also means that the security of 
the solution is completely independent of the network topology or transport protocol. 
This makes WS-Security a very desirable model. It guarantees that as long as the send-
ing and receiving systems have been built according to WS-Security specification, mes-
sages can be routed through any number of intermediate nodes in any kind of network 
topology. Trade-offs for this flexible model include significantly higher performance 
requirement for systems processing the messages, increased message size and a fairly 
complex implementation model. 
WS-Security specification describes how message integrity and confidentiality can be 
achieved by using digital signatures or encryption [Law06]. Original sender of the mes-
sage can be identified via an embedded security token such as a X509 certificate, SAML 
assertion or Kerberos tickets [NNA09]. WS-Security builds on top of XML Digital sig-
natures (XMLDSIG) and XML encryption (XMLENC) standards [Law06] with small 
adaptations to fit the SOAP envelope structure. WS-Security specification is rather flex-
ible regarding how the protection mechanisms can be used; encryption and signature 
can be used independently or together and it is possible to select only specific parts or 
the entire message to be protected [Law06].  
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WS-Security relies heavily on Public Key Cryptography. The fundamental capability 
offered by asymmetric public/private key pairs is the ability to encrypt or sign data with 
one of the keys and the decrypt or verify signature with another key [Vac04]. Neither of 
the keys can be used alone to perform both actions. To be able to use Public Key Cryp-
tography in an organized manner certain amount of infrastructure including people, pro-
cesses, policies and systems are needed to manage the keys and their usage [DaM09]. 
This is referred as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). PKI introduces the concepts of a 
Certificate Authority (CA) and Registration Authority (RA). RA is responsible for veri-
fying the identity of the entity that possesses the public key and the CA is responsible 
for binding this entity to a digital certificate containing the public key [DaM09]. While 
the PKI based systems are currently regarded as being very secure, the required infra-
structure is fairly complex and expensive. 
Figure 4.1 displays the nested element structure of a SOAP message which is digitally 
signed according to WS-Security specification. When comparing the signed SOAP mes-
sage in Figure 4.1 to the empty SOAP envelope presented in Chapter 3.1 (Figure 3.1) it 
is obvious how much additional complexity the digital signature scheme brings.  One 
could also argue that the picture is a rather good argument for the SOAP critics who are 
worried about the additional overhead of the SOAP protocol and general complexity of 
the WS-Security. 
Regardless of the complexity of the digital signatures, they have some distinct ad-
vantages when done according to the specification. Sending and receiving systems are 
not required to know anything about each other as the message is completely self-
describing regarding the keys and algorithms used. When message sender signs a SOAP 
message with his/her private key and attaches the public key as a digital certificate to 
the message, the message receiver can verify the signature and be sure that the signature 
has been created with the private key matching to the public key in the certificate. If the 
message receiver trusts the CA which has issued the digital certificate, he can be sure 
that the content of the message has not changed during transit and that the message has 
originated from the holder of the private key. Furthermore the receiver can store the 
received request to be used as a proof that the message has originated from a specific 
sender holding a specific private key. 
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Figure 4.1 nested structure of a digitally signed SOAP message. 
 
When the received message is stored persistently or logged as-is it can be later on used 
as a proof of that the message must have originated from a sender possessing a specific 
private key. This is what is generally referred as non-repudiation [PKP08]. The sender 
of the message can not deny sending of the message since it has been signed with 
his/her personal private key. This can be proven any time by recalculating the digital 
signature found from the message by using the public key of the sender which is includ-
ed in the original stored message. 
Since digital signatures created with asymmetric keys that are issued by an approved 
identity provider are considered as a form or strong electronic authentication it is very 
important to store the private keys in a secure way. Stealing a public-private key pair 
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means stealing of an identity. Once noticed, this threat can be mitigated through the 
tools offered by PKI such as Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL). CRL in essence is a 
blacklist for compromised certificates not to be accepted even if the certificate data is 
valid. Due to the sensitive nature of the private keys it is often considered to be unsafe 
to store them in user devices which are directly connected to internet and vulnerable to 
different kinds of attacks. To limit the risks digital certificates are stored in special 
hardware security tokens which only allow signature generation in the hardware token, 
but never allow the private key to be exported outside of the device. Some of the mod-
ern mobile devices contain an isolated hardware security module called Secure Element 
which can be used for storing such keys. Secure Elements are elaborated in more detail 
in Chapter 5. 
4.2 Security of XML based RESTful Web Services 
XML based RESTful services can partially benefit from the mature XML related securi-
ty standards mentioned in the previous chapter. The most important standards are 
XMLDSIG, which can be used non-repudiation and message integrity, and XMLENC 
which can be used to assure confidentiality. By using X509 certificates to perform these 
operations the user can prove his identity by attaching the X509 certificate to the signed 
XML request. 
These mechanisms are valid in the cases where the request and response message con-
tain a XML payload that can be protected by signing or encrypting. Problems arise with 
HTTP GET and DELETE methods which do not contain a payload [Fie99]. If there is 
no message to be signed, because the request is for example a HTTP GET to fetch a 
resource from a specific URL, it is not possible to sign or encrypt anything and attach 
an X509 certificate. This in turn leads to a situation where the service provider can not 
identify the service requestor. 
Same problem exists for verifying the identity of the service in case of empty response 
messages. Most typical empty response would be for example HTTP response code 302 
which is indicating a redirect [Fie99]. There would be no way to authenticate the service 
provider’s identity that has provided this response code since the response does not in-
clude a payload that could be signed. 
Additional problems arise due to the structure of the RESTful messages. As explained 
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in Section 3.2, a RESTful request/response consists of three sections. XML can be only 
used in the payload, meaning that the two others (HTTP headers, URL) would be left 
unprotected. It would be possible to include header and URL related information to the 
payload, but that would increase message size, bring additional complexity and strongly 
violate the REST ideology. 
Conclusion is that the benefit provided by using existing XML related security stand-
ards with XML based RESTful Web Services is very limited. The main use cases are 
HTTP POST and HTTP PUT based services which contain a request/response payload. 
Using different security solutions for different request types would create significant 
additional complexity. The recommendation is to protect XML based RESTful services 
with similar means as explained in the next section for JSON based restful services. 
4.3 Security of JSON based RESTful Web Services 
RESTful Web Services do not have a built in security model. Although Roy Fielding 
mentions “enforcement of security” several times in his dissertation there are no con-
crete requirements or instructions how to build secure RESTful services [Fie00]. Serme 
et. al. conclude that RESTful Web Services lack the means to describe security related 
meta data requirements and that most of the public RESTful Web Service implementa-
tions rely on ad hoc and custom security solutions [Ser12]. 
As mentioned in chapter 2.1 one requirement for RESTful Web Services is to be state-
less. This poses new requirements for the security solutions that can be used. Traditional 
model used by many Web applications where cookies are sent by the customer’s brows-
er for identifying an authenticated session held by the Web Server must be replaced with 
something else. Since the requirement is to be stateless, one common approach for re-
placing server side sessions is a token based approach [BH14]. The token must self-
describing, have a limited lifetime, be cryptographically protected and contain all in-
formation necessary for the validation of the token. Previous trust relation must be es-
tablished between the party who issues the token and the party who validates the token 
if they are not the one and the same. Since the token is cryptographically protected, 
“previous trust” generally refers to a key exchange where the validating party must have 
access to the crypto keys which are needed in the token validation. This can be done via 
a shared key store or by physically exchanging the keys.  
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Challenges of the token based approach relate to managing the lifecycle of a token. 
Once the token is issued it will have a fixed validity period which can not be altered. 
This generates the need for some supporting capabilities to enable similar session man-
agement that is seen with traditional Web applications today. For example how to con-
tinue an active session if the token is about to expire, or how to deactivate a token if the 
customer decides to end the session.  
Two security related standards which are often brought up in the RESTful context are 
OpenID and OAuth. Both of these also utilize a token based approach. OpenID is a 
standard for federated authentication [Fer07]. It has two main parties, identity provider 
and relying party. This means that the user registers with the identity provider and after 
that he can authenticate to any relying party who has established a trust relation with the 
identity provider.  
OpenID is not seen as an attractive option for the Bank. European Anti-Money Launder-
ing regulation contains strict Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements. KYC requires 
that the institution must meet the new customer face to face before strong electronic 
identification credentials can be issued. So the Bank already acts as an identity provider 
and there is no further need for federation within the services that the Bank provides. 
Furthermore current OpenID versions are strongly tied to a HTML based web user inter-
face for selecting the identity provider [Fer07]. Although technically this could be con-
sidered to still be RESTfull, since its http/https based, a fixed user interface fits poorly 
in to an integration scenario where the desire is to use services via API:s and have full 
control over the UI. 
OAuth is a federated authorization protocol [Har12]. As the official description ex-
plains, it is targeted for authorization which is different from authentication as previous-
ly explained. Despite of OAuth being an authorization protocol it still contains some 
elements that can be used for authentication purposes. Typically OAuth is used for dele-
gating authorizations to a third party application [Ham10]. For example a third party 
RSS feed reader might use OAuth to request authorization from the user to read a se-
cured RSS feed on behalf of the user. Although the main focus of OAuth is the specific 
use case where a resource owner authorizes a third party to access a resource from a 
provider, there are other supported scenarios. One of them is the so called two-legged 
OAuth that enables authentication between a requester and a resource provider [Ham10] 
which corresponds with the authentication scenario presented in this thesis.  
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OAuth 1.0 is currently the only accepted IETF standard for RESTful services which 
also contains message level protection with digital signatures or Hashed Message Au-
thentication Codes. Unfortunately there is a specific issue with the content that can be 
signed, the HMAC or RSA signature does not cover payload data for HTTP POST or 
PUT methods with typical RESTful content-types such as XML or JSON. Only “appli-
cation/x-www-form-urlencoded” content type is supported [Ham10]. This basically 
limits the content to the typical key value pairs produced by HTML forms. Latest ver-
sion OAuth 2.0 has completely dropped support for message level protection. This has 
led to some controversy and as a result OAuth 2.0 specification leader Eran Hammer-
Lahav has resigned from the workgroup and publicly criticized weak security of the 
specification. 
Although OAuth is heavily used by the Internet giants such as Google and Facebook, 
several security concerns have been presented. Feng Yang and Maharam have done a 
root-cause analyze for the OAuth security weaknesses and conclude that there are sev-
eral threats in different steps of the protocol [FeM13]. OAuth is not considered secure 
enough for financial transactions by the Banks IT Security department either and there-
fore it will not be analyzed deeper in this paper.  
One typical approach to RESTful authentication is a HMAC based custom authentica-
tion scheme with shared keys, utilized by Amazon S3 and Microsoft Azure services for 
example. This scheme is based on Hashed Message Authentication Codes which are 
created by calculating a keyed-hash sum from a message and a message key
4
 [Kra97]. 
The use of individual keys per user is the essential element that enables HMAC signa-
tures to be used for authentication. In the HMAC authentication process the service 
consumer must first obtain a secret key that is shared with the service. Issuing the keys 
happens in a registration or an enrolment process. The issued secret key is later used for 
calculating the Hashed Message Authentication Code, initially by the sender to protect 
the message and prove his identity and later by receiver to verify the integrity of the 
message and the identity of the sender.  
One advantage of HMACs is that Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA) are much faster and 
less CPU consuming than Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Data Encryption 
                                                 
4
 Message key is often also referred as API key or secret key in the RESTful context 
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Standard (DES) based functions [SiS11]. AES and DES based functions are typically 
used in asymmetric cryptography. This is especially relevant in the mobile context 
where the resources of the application execution environment are limited.  
The process of generating a HMAC based signature for a RESTful request consists of a 
custom canonicalization protocol which is specified by the service provider. The canon-
icalization protocol must define how HTTP headers, request URL and request payload 
are normalized. In practice it defines how different parts ordered, encoded and concate-
nated to generate one long string that represents the entire request (also referred as ca-
nonical request). After that the HMAC is calculated by the client from the canonical 
request by using the shared secret key. The HMAC digest is then attached as a HTTP 
header with an identifier referencing the specific key that was used for calculating the 
digest so that the receiver knows which key must be used for the verification process. 
The HMAC needs to be generated for every single request, so this fulfills the stateless 
requirement for RESTful Web Services. When the service provider receives the request, 
the first action is to fetch the secret key based on the identifier provided by the custom-
er. After that the same canonicalization and HMAC calculation processes are applied as 
previously done by the sender. The final step is to compare the HMAC digest provided 
by the customer to the digest calculated by the service provider. If the two digests are 
identical, it means that the request must have originated from the holder of the key ref-
erenced. The integrity of the request has been verified and the sender of the request is 
authenticated. 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has established a working group called “JavaS-
cript Object Signing and Encryption”. This working group is working to develop similar 
security standards for JSON that exist for XML/SOAP. One of the most crucial things 
that are needed to get interoperable digital signatures across multiple platforms is a ma-
ture canonicalization mechanism that would also addresses the requirements of HTTP 
protocol.  
Purely JSON related security standards are not going to solve the problem for RESTful 
services. The fundamental complexity comes from the fact that the security solution has 
to address both a transport protocol and a message format due to the tight coupling of 
RESTful Web Services in to HTTP protocol. This is a likely  reason why mature REST-
ful security specifications still don’t exist to this day. 
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4.4 Conclusion and recommended security solution 
Based on the information presented in this chapter it is strongly recommended to build 
message level protection in to the solution in addition to the standard SSL transport pro-
tection. The main alternatives are digital signatures according to the WS-Security speci-
fication for SOAP and Hashed Message Authentication Codes for RESTful services. 
RESTful services with XML can offer protection only for limited use cases. WS-
Security has an advantage being a proven standard. Hashed Message Authentication 
Code is a well-established standard as well, but applying it to the different parts of a 
HTTP request is a custom practice demonstrated by Amazon and others. 
Solutions based on asymmetric cryptography are generally regarded as being more se-
cure than the symmetric counterparts, due to the nature of the keys. With asymmetric 
keys the private key is never shared which is one of the enablers for non-repudiation. As 
long as the holder of the key stores it carefully, there can be no doubt of who has used 
the key. With symmetric keys the secret key must be shared between the customer and 
the service provider. This means that key has to be initially securely transported be-
tween the two, and in case of dispute it might be difficult to prove which party has actu-
ally used or leaked the key.  
Due to the nature of the asymmetric and symmetric keys, SOAP based solutions with 
WS-security can offer slightly better security than RESTful Web Services with HMACs. 
The difference is mostly related to the non-repudiation related aspects since both mech-
anisms provide message integrity and authentication. 
Both asymmetric and symmetric cryptographic security solutions share the same charac-
teristics regarding configurability; it is usually rather trivial to improve the security lev-
el of the system by increasing the key length and selecting a stronger variant of the algo-
rithm in use.  
Most likely vulnerabilities for digital signature or HMAC based solutions are not related 
to the algorithms being brute forced or broken. The weakest link in the process is typi-
cally related to the key handling process. If the attacker is able to penetrate the initial 
key exchange process, or steal the persistently stored keys from mobile devices or ser-
vice provider, both solutions are similarly vulnerable.  
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4.5 Web Services related security considerations 
Security of the Web Services exposed in to open internet can not be guaranteed only by 
selecting and applying the right security standard to the solution. There are several im-
plementation related and operational considerations which should be taken in to consid-
eration. The Web Service endpoint acts as a gateway to the internal core systems which 
store one of the most valuable assets that a company possesses: the data. It is crucial to 
ensure that this gateway can only be used for accessing certain limited data according to 
rules and policies specified in the authentication and authorization requirements. This 
section lists certain best practices and solutions to make sure that the published Web 
Services are properly secured. These practices are gathered from OWASP Top 10 lists, 
European Central Bank recommendation for secure mobile payments and from recom-
mendations by Information Security companies. 
Server Hardening is recommended to limit the attack surface available in the environ-
ment that hosts the Web Services [ECB13]. Typical means for hardening include: use 
the servers for only one purpose (hosting the Web Service), block access to all other 
TCP ports than the one the Web Service is listening to, disable unused operating system 
services, install latest security patches, limit admin access only from predefined loca-
tions and make the initial installation of operating system and patches in a safe network 
environment. Any clues about the used hardware or operating systems or software li-
braries (such as informational HTTP headers) should be hidden to make it more difficult 
to reuse known weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the components. 
Injections can happen in multiple ways. The most famous is the SQL injection where 
the attacker is able to inject additional parameters to the SQL query executed by the 
database [OWA13]. Other scenarios include for example JavaScript injection in to the 
JSON payload to be executed by the server or XML content inside [PMP10] the JSON 
request which might be later on executed in the SOAP based SOA layer
5
. Any data sent 
by the service consumer which is stored and potentially later on viewed with a browser 
contains the risk of injections. Malicious JavaScript embedded in to the data might be 
evaluated and executed by the browser of the person who is viewing the data. Typical 
protection means include input data validation and filtering, sanitizing all user input, 
                                                 
5
 Billion laughs is a typical example of an XML based attack, a simple XML document contains cyclical 
references and when the parsers loads the document it expands to consume all available memory of the 
system. 
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escaping SQL, HTML, JavaScript, XML and JSON related special characters and con-
figuring memory usage limitations for parsers. 
Authentication and session management is a sensitive area that needs to work seamless-
ly end-to-end [OWA13]. It’s not sufficient to have a strong authentication protocol if the 
session management of the system leaks. Stealing of sessions must be made difficult, 
particular challenge in the mobile environment is that the IP address of the customer can 
change any time due to the nature of the mobile networks or switching between Wi-Fi 
and a data connection. Typical means include a strong session protocol which is seam-
lessly integrated to the initial authentication, use of SSL, active logout which invalidates 
the session, destruction of single-sign-on tickets and message level security with digital 
signatures or message authentication codes. When digital signatures or HMACs are 
used the attacker needs to have a local access to the targeted device to steal the key used 
for signature, while with ordinary session identifiers it might be sufficient just to capture 
network traffic [ECB13]. 
Insecure Direct Object References is a typical problem for RESTful services [OWA13]. 
As shown in the bookstore example earlier, the address to fetch a book details contained 
directly the identifier of the book. Now imagine the same example for fetching the de-
tails of a bank account: “HTTP GET www.mybank.com/account/FI123456789”. It 
shouldn’t be possible to fetch any unauthorized data by guessing identifiers. Primary 
mean for preventing direct object references are properly implemented authorization 
rules where every request is authorized against a listing of the assets available for the 
customer, and indirect object references
6
. Indirect object references that are artificial 
identifiers which only might have a lifetime during one session can also be used as a 
mitigation measure [OWA13]. 
Authorization and business rules should be implemented and enforced server side and 
all input coming from the mobile applications should be treated as untrusted. There are 
no definitive ways to identify the calling application since the application and the Web 
Service endpoint have been made publicly available. One could reverse engineer the 
mobile application, copy the decompiled source code, and make a version that circum-
vents business rules built in to the application. 
                                                 
6
 Indirect references violate against the RESTful principles since they can not be cached or directly linked 
as a bookmark [Fie00]. However the nature of the content provided by the financial services is sensitive 
and no automatic caching should be allowed anyway and bookmarking is not relevant in the context of 
native mobile applications. 
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Sensitive data exposure can happen in surprising areas even if the authentication and 
security solutions are properly build [OWA13]. All HTTP response messages should 
have appropriate HTTP headers indicating that no caching is allowed so that the data 
doesn’t end up stored in network devices. Previously mentioned indirect object refer-
ences also help here. Web Servers typically gather access logs of all incoming requests, 
if the request URL contains sensitive information it might end up visible for unauthor-
ized personnel. The strength of the used encryption algorithms should be appropriate. 
Encryption keys should be adequately protected and there should be a rehearsed process 
in place to change and replace the keys if they have leaked. Risks and mitigation 
measures regarding data exposure in the mobile devices and applications are explained 
in more detail in Chapter 5. SSL should be always used to maintain confidentiality. 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks aim to make a service or a network una-
vailable by sending more traffic to the system than it has resources (network or compu-
ting) to process [Mas13]. Typically they are implemented by botnets with hundreds to 
hundred thousand nodes. It is impossible to prevent DDoS attacks but the impact can be 
mitigated. Most importantly the internet facing systems must be isolated so that in case 
of a DDoS attack other business systems can continue to operate normally
7
. A typical 
mean for isolating is by configuring throttling limitations to the Web Services layer. For 
example the Web Service interface might process maximum 200 requests per second 
and throttle or discard anything above that. This way it’s possible to safeguard the busi-
ness critical core systems and agree on a maximum level of traffic they will receive. 
Mitigating the impact of a DDoS attack against the mobile channel will require collabo-
ration with the internet operator(s) to stop the traffic early enough. If the attack is miti-
gated only when the traffic reaches the bank it is usually too late. It is possible to send 
so much traffic that even if the throttling mechanism would be able to handle the load, 
communication lines will choke and all services behind these communication lines be-
come unavailable. 
                                                 
7
 A severe example of not isolating the systems properly was seen in Finland in 2014. A DDoS attack 
against the internet portal of OP Bank brought down cash withdrawals from ATM’s and card payments 
which used online cover reservations [Tiv15]  
44 
5 Remote communication and security feature support in 
mobile platforms  
This chapter investigates the selected mobile platforms Apple iOS, Google Android and 
Microsoft Windows Phone. The aim is to discover what kind of support exists for re-
mote communications and what type of local security mechanism are offered by the 
platforms to be used as a part of securing the remote communications. The goal is to 
find a common denominator for all platforms to be able to offer a single solution which 
can be utilized by applications running in any of the platforms. 
The main focus of the comparison on the protocol level is SOAP with WS-Security 
support and RESTful / JSON support. Security-wise the focus is in supported HMAC 
algorithms, handling of secret keys via platform key stores, advanced features such as 
secure elements, capability to manipulate SSL handshake to inject extra security 
measures and other additional security features which might prove out to be useful. 
First some background knowledge regarding the mobile platforms is provided. All of 
the mentioned platforms come with a number of security features intended for securing 
the local execution of the native application such as sandboxing, signed binaries, protec-
tion of local data and explicit grant of privileges for the application by the user (either at 
installation or run time)[App14, Goo15a, Mic15a]. There is slight variation in the im-
plementations between platforms but the fundamental principles are rather closely 
aligned.  
Another significant contributor to the overall security of the system is the secure distri-
bution channel for the applications. All of the platforms have dedicated App stores for 
publishing and distributing applications developed by third parties [App15a, Goo15a, 
Mic14]. There are multiple slightly varying processes to go through before an applica-
tion can be published. The publisher must enrol to the app store to be authenticated, the 
app to be published is subject to a review and there are multiple guidelines which define 
requirements by the platform owners that the mobile applications must adhere to. These 
processes are in place to limit phishing, spreading of viruses and fake applications and 
to build consumer trust towards the official market places.  
Regardless of the efforts by the platform vendors, mobile malware exists and is an in-
creasing risk as reported by F-Secure and other security analysts [FSE14]. There are 
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Root / Jailbreak kits available for both iOS and Android platforms. These kits essential-
ly allow the user to remove all platform security limitations and obtain full access with 
root privileges to the device. Obviously the users who disable the platforms built in pro-
tection mechanisms expose themselves to a much greater risk. 
Comparing the detailed security features of the app stores and local mobile execution 
environments between the different ecosystems would be an interesting topic, but it is 
not in the scope of this thesis. Last section of this chapter lists common best practices 
which can be used to enhance the security of the mobile application and some not so 
well known pitfalls that should be avoided. 
5.1 Apple iOS 
Apple iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple Inc. It shares the same 
Unix-like Darwin foundation which is the core of Apple’s desktop computer operating 
system OS X [LHC11]. The user interface in iOS is optimized for touch screen devices 
[Der14]. iOS was introduced in 2007 and it is currently supported by all of the apple 
touch screen device families such as iPhone, iPad and iPod touch. Xcode is the only 
development environment for iOS SDK and Objective-C is the primary programming 
language for iOS [Der14]. 
Remote communications support in iOS is heavily focused towards HTTP based REST-
ful communications. iOS online API library confirms that the platforms does not pro-
vide any built in SOAP / WS-Security support [App15d]. There are some open source 
SOAP tools available, but most of them are not actively maintained and have received 
poor ratings on the developer discussion forums. Same was confirmed within the Bank 
in a proof-of-concept where some of the libraries were evaluated. Multiple bugs were 
found and only a limited set of SOAP specification was supported. For WS-Security 
which would enable message level security, there was no support at all.  
RESTful Web Services basically require very limited support from the platform. As long 
as there is a programmable HTTP client API available with the support for the required 
HTTP methods it can be concluded that the platform supports RESTful Web Services. 
This is the case with iOS as documented in the iOS API specification [App15b]. Anoth-
er interesting aspect is the support for the selected content type JSON. iOS contains a 
native JSON support [App15c] starting from iOS version 5. 
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Apple iOS contains support for the commonly used HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC-
SHA512 functions [App06]. Other common security features are detailed in the security 
specification provided by the platform provider [App14]. Some of the relevant and in-
teresting features in the context of this thesis include an API called Keychain. Keychain 
can be used to manage sensitive data such as passwords, encryption keys or X509 certif-
icates. Each application has its own keychain and by default the user has to explicitly 
grant access to any other application that wants to access another keychain than its own. 
As previously explained, digital signatures backed by a proper PKI infrastructure can 
offer very strong security. However one of the key requirements is the secure storage of 
the private key. Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in the iOS keychain im-
plementation [HeE12], although they have been rapidly patched in subsequent versions. 
One can question how trustworthy the keychain foundation is. This is typically the case 
for almost all software-based key stores. The keychain can certainly be used as a sup-
plementary security solution, but it is questionable if it should be the cornerstone of the 
authentication and security solution. 
The optimal storage for private keys is the Secure Element. Secure element is an inde-
pendent hardware based tamperproof storage and execution environment that can be 
found for example from EMV chip based credit/debit cards or from the SIM cards pro-
vided by the mobile network operators. Apple devices which utilize the iOS operating 
system do not have a built in secure element which could be utilized by 3
rd
 party appli-
cations running on top of the platform. The secure element found from iPhone 6 devices 
is currently exclusively meant to be used by the new Apple Pay payment scheme. An-
other interesting feature in the latest iOS devices is fingerprint recognition. In the intial 
release the fingerprint recognition is reserved for Apple proprietary solutions and it can 
not be utilized by 3
rd
 party authentication solutions [App14]. 
5.2 Google Android 
Android is a mobile operating system originally developed by Android Inc, acquired by 
Google in 2005. First Android version was launched in 2007. The operating system is 
based on the open source Linux kernel [Goo14]. Android is primarily targeted for touch 
screen devices such as mobile phones and tablets, but there are several other extensions 
such as Android-TV, Android Car and even digital cameras with the Android OS 
[Goo15e]. Android applications run on the Dalvik virtual machine, the programming 
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language is based on Java syntax, but due to licensing disagreements it is not officially 
Java [CNE14]. It does not fulfill the Java specification and only a subset of Java fea-
tures is supported, and Android specific extensions have been added.  
There is a significant difference between iOS and Android in how the operating system 
is being developed. While Apple has total control over iOS operating system and the 
hardware devices that run the operating system, Android is distributed as a plain vanilla 
version and hardware manufacturers are allowed to customize the operating system for 
their specific needs regarding functionality and branding. This has led to the situation 
where Android is significantly fragmented. After a new version of official Android op-
erating system is published, it typically takes some time before the phone manufactures 
have ported the changes to their customized version Android OS [Ars13]. As a conse-
quence, critical security vulnerabilities that have been discovered and fixed in the main 
Android OS have been significantly delayed before being available for all of the modi-
fied Android versions [GoD14]. 
Remote communications support in Android closely resembles the situation with iOS. 
SOAP based Web Services are not natively supported by the platform as indicated by 
the Android API reference [Goo15f]. Third party libraries exist, but they contain limited 
support for the specification and especially WS-Security specification is not supported 
at all. On the other hand, RESTful Web Services are fully supported. There is an API for 
a HTTP client supporting different HTTP methods and JSON is natively supported by 
the operating system [Goo15b, Goo15c]. 
Android provides support for the commonly used HMAC functions similarly to Apple 
iOS [Goo15g]. Android 4.3 “Jelly Bean” release contains a feature called Android Key 
Store [Goo15d], which is the primary API that should be used for operating with keys. 
Interestingly the Key Store API also has built in support for Secure Element based key 
stores, which means that there is a truly secure way of managing key pairs in the An-
droid on a built in hardware chip [Goo15d]. Unfortunately the number of devices con-
taining the Secure Element is fairly limited. Another limitation is that there is a signifi-
cant user base with older low end Android devices which only support older 2.X ver-
sions of Android. Therefore the benefits of using Secure Elements via the Key Store 
should be evaluated as it might limit the usage of the applications for significant number 
of Android users. 
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Latest high end Android devices such as Samsung S5 contain a built in fingerprint scan-
ner. So far Android is lacking native support for finger print recognition [And14], but 
for example Samsung has opened their library for others to use [Poc14]. Fingerprint 
scanners will greatly improve the security of the end user device in case of theft, but so 
far there are not many applications which would use the fingerprint reader for actual 
user authentication. This might very well change in the near future. 
5.3 Microsoft Windows Phone 
Windows Phone is a mobile operating system by Microsoft Corporation. Windows 
Phone was originally launched in 2010 and it is the successor for the Windows Mobile. 
Original version was Windows Phone 7, it is a complete remake after Windows Mobile 
and the operating systems are incompatible regarding applications. Same incompatibly 
goes for versions 7 and 8.x within the Windows Phone family. Windows Phone 8.x is 
primarily targeted for mobile phones and tablets. For the tablets Microsoft also has 
Windows RT which is targeted for devices running ARMv7 based chipsets. Windows 
Phone and Windows RT are also incompatible which has caused some confusion in the 
Windows Apps space. 
In terms of app development Windows Phone is more flexible than the competing An-
droid and iOS based systems. Applications are running on Windows Phone Runtime, 
they can be developed with VB.NET or C#. Native Windows Runtime components can 
be developed in C++ or CX. There are multiple user interface solutions such as XNA or 
Windows Phone Studio. Microsoft also has a concept called Universal Apps, the appli-
cations conforming to this standard can run out-of-the-box either on Windows 8 or 
Windows Phone 8 based operating systems. 
One could say that in terms of third party usage Windows Phone sits somewhere be-
tween iOS and Android. There are multiple device manufactures who utilize the operat-
ing system but the manufactures are not allowed to tailor the operating system for their 
specific needs as can be done with Android. So far Windows Phone has not gained sig-
nificant market shares globally, in Europe and especially in the Nordics the situation is a 
bit better. 
In the previous Windows Phone versions 7.x and 8.0 SOAP has been one of the sup-
ported communication protocols via the Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) 
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framework. However for the latest Windows Phone 8.1 version SOAP support has been 
deprecated from WCF for Windows Mobile. No official announcements have been 
done, but Microsoft employees have confirmed the discovery in the Microsoft develop-
er forums [Mic15e]. This has caused some controversy in the Windows developer space 
as it yet another hiccup for the Universal applications when the integration capabilities 
between desktop and mobile do not match [Mic15e]. 
On the other hand, the removal of the SOAP support by Microsoft who is one of the key 
contributors of the original SOAP standard can be seen as a rather strong message stat-
ing they don’t believe in SOAP usage in the mobile environment. Similar message is 
distributed via Microsoft blog’s where the disappointed developers searching for the lost 
SOAP support are instructed to expose their end points as RESTful Web Services. This 
is a fair advice to those developers who have control over the end point; others unable 
to impact the service design are left disappointed.  
As obvious based on the text above and confirmed by the Windows Phone API specifi-
cation, RESTful Web Services and JSON are natively supported by Windows Phone 
[Mic15b] [Mic15c]. It contains a programmable HTTP client like iOS and Android as 
well and supports the needed HTTP methods. One distinct difference in the Windows 
Phone platform is related to the lack of API:s that can be used to hook in to the SSL 
handshake process [Cod14]. In iOS and Android it is possible to build additional valida-
tion logic into the SSL handshake to implement functionality called “Certificate Pin-
ning” which is used to prevent advanced Man-In-The-Middle attacks based on forged 
CA certificates, in Windows Phone a third party HTTP client needs to be used to be able 
to achieve this functionality. Certificate pinning is elaborated more detail in chapter 5.5. 
Windows Phone contains support for the commonly used HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC-
512 functions [Mic15f]. Other interesting functionality related to key management is 
called Key Container for storing RSA keys and certificates [Mic15d]. In addition all of 
the basic functionality such as generating key pairs, signature generation and encryption 
are fully supported. So far there haven’t been any security bulletins regarding vulnera-
bilities in the Windows Phone key management area. This might be due to an extremely 
solid implementation, but one other rather likely reason is that so far there are no reports 
of successful jail breaking / rooting of Windows Phone based devices. As seen with iOS 
and Android most of the serious attacks require that the attacker manages to do a suc-
cessful privilege escalation before the vulnerable API:s can be misused. Whether Win-
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dows Phone is designed to be more secure than iOS and Android, or is it only the lack 
of interest from the attackers since globally it is a rather marginal operating system, is 
still an open question. 
Windows Phone supports the use of SIM card based Secure Elements which enables 
secure authentication, but the dependency towards the SIM card also means a depend-
ency towards the operator. Latest Windows Phone version 8.1 also includes a feature 
called Trusted Platform Module (TPM) which usually referred as Secure Element. TPM 
enables the storage credentials and cryptographic keys for performing cryptographic 
operations (referred as Virtual Smart Cards by Microsoft) [Mic15a]. So far no Windows 
Phone based devices with finger print authentication have been published. 
5.4 Common denominator in supported remote communication 
protocols 
Based on the previous Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 it is obvious that all of the selected Mo-
bile platforms have selected RESTful Web Services as preferred integration pattern. 
This is also clearly stated in the developer guidelines published by the platform vendors. 
SOAP is only supported in previous versions of Windows Phone. All of the platforms 
support the fundamental pre-requirements for SOAP, meaning a HTTP client + XML 
support, but building a working client which conforms to the SOAP standard on top of 
the primitives will be an extensive task. Crafting the missing SOAP support is will de-
crease the productivity from the actual development work for a long time. Extending the 
homegrown SOAP client to support WS-Security for the best possible security solution 
changes the amount of work extensive to significant. This is also hinted by the fact that 
the open source SOAP frameworks for iOS and Android haven’t even published exper-
imental versions with WS-Security support. 
Security-wise the platforms do not offer many built in capabilities for the remote com-
munications, any security solution going beyond simple SSL + HTTP basic authentica-
tion need to be handcrafted. For this purpose all of the platforms contain support for the 
commonly used HMAC functions with similar strengths. The support for HMAC func-
tions enables message level protection with Hashed Message Authentication Codes.  
One common security factor that can be utilized with all platforms is device registration 
(also called device authentication or device enrolment). This is especially relevant due 
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to the nature of the mobile, as explained in Section 2.6. The mobile device can automat-
ically hop between networks or base stations to switch from Wi-Fi to mobile data and 
vice versa. This leads to a frequently changing IP address which means that client IP 
address is not a security factor that could be used for protection the integrity of an au-
thenticated session and therefore it is relevant to find other means for protection against 
session theft.  
Basically device authentication means that the app and device combination needs to be 
pre-registered by the customer before he can start to use the actual services (this is elab-
orated in more detail in Section 6.2). Device authentication can be combined both to 
user authentication and request authentication; for making sure that the customer is au-
thenticating from a previously registered device and for making sure that all of the re-
quests in a single session are originating from the same physical device.  
All platforms contain functionality for storing sensitive keys in a key chain / key store, 
but the reliability of these mechanisms has been questioned by successful attacks both 
in Android and iOS platforms [Hay14, HeE12]. If X509 certificates are stored in the 
mobile device outside of the Secure Element it is a good precaution to limit the use of 
the certificates only within the mobile channel for specific services and not as a general 
purpose identity mechanism for any type of service. This is to limit the impact of a pos-
sible breach. Wider adaptation and standardization of Secure Elements and in mobile 
devices might very well be the key “enabler” which simplifies the development of se-
cure and trusted mobile applications really to take off despite the increasing efforts of 
malicious attackers. 
5.5 Other security related considerations for mobile platforms 
There are several best practices and security improvements which can be used to harden 
the mobile applications against certain typical attacks. These measures and guidelines 
can be used to increase trust towards the device, limit the possibility of information 
leakage in the device, provide additional security for SSL protected communications 
and to make sure business logic is placed in the right layer so it can not be easily cir-
cumvented. 
There is no definite way of protecting an application that has been published and is exe-
cuted in a non-controlled environment, but following these recommendations will in-
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crease the effort required to craft an attack against the mobile applications.  
Certificate pinning is a technique where additional validation logic is built in to the SSL 
handshake. Core purpose of the validation logic is to limit the number of trusted Certifi-
cate Authorities (CA) [Wal14] by explicitly white listing the trusted SSL issuer(s) 
[OWA14]. By default there are tens or hundreds of trusted CA certificates including 
various different types of companies such as Hong Kong post in the platform trust store. 
And even worse, it is possible for users to manually install new trusted CA’s without 
truly understanding what is a CA and if it should be trusted or not. 
The extra protection provided by certificate pinning is needed due to prevent a specific 
Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) attack called “malicious WiFi access point attack”. For 
example, anyone can park a car outside of the Hilton hotel and create a WiFi access 
point called “Hilton Free WiFi”. This alone doesn’t get the attacker far. But if the at-
tacker also creates a forged login page for the WiFi network that instructs the user to 
provide his email address for receiving a key for the network it will be possible to get a 
certain percentage of the users to install a malicious CA certificate. The attacker also 
needs to configure a “poisoned” Domain Name Service (DNS) to provide a forged end-
point which routes all traffic through his endpoint. For example 
https://mobilebank.bank.com in the WiFi network. This example URL is then protected 
with a false SSL certificate which the platform would trust by default since the signing 
CA was added to the phone trust store by the when the user accepted to install the CA 
certificate in the email. This will enable a MiTM attack to break the SSL session and 
leave all data visible and potentially modifiable to the attacker unless there is message 
level protection in place. With certificate pinning implemented the attack is not possible 
since the attacker can not get the malicious CA in to the original hardcoded whitelist of 
trusted CA:s provided by the app publisher [Wal14]. 
Avoid local storage of sensitive data in the mobile device. Any data that is stored on the 
end user device is data that could be stolen. By storing the data outside of the mobile 
device, this attack vector is closed [OWA14]. Best practice is to store all sensitive data 
in the backend systems with multiple layers of protection before it can be accessed from 
Internet [ECB13]. When there is a mandatory business need to store data locally on the 
device, a good practice for protecting the locally stored data is to either store only server 
side encrypted information, or deliver encryption keys from backend server only after a 
successful multifactor authentication. Despite the fact that all of the mobile operating 
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systems come with a platform intended way of securely storing data, only one new criti-
cal security vulnerability need to be discovered and the data might be easily accessible 
for the attacker. 
Disable caching from platform libraries some platform specific HTTP client libraries 
come with a default caching enabled. This might lead to undesired situations where sen-
sitive data is cached by the platform. For example the HTTP client provided by the iOS 
platform has request caching enabled by default [App15e]. In the worst case scenario a 
HTTP post request containing user credentials is stored in the platform cache which 
might be harvested by malicious applications. 
Jailbreak detection is a mechanism to detect if the user has installed a Jailbreak / Root-
ing kit on his phone to perform privilege escalation. While the use of a jailbroken phone 
is not a direct threat, it still exposes the user’s device for multiple operating system 
weaknesses and makes it a desirable target for malware, trojans and phishing apps. De-
pending on the use case the service provider should decide if jailbroken devices are 
completely blocked from the service, or if the information is just passed to the backend 
risk assessment engine where the final decision for accepting the transaction can be 
done [ECB13]. Although there are no definite numbers available, it appears that a sig-
nificant portion of the attacks towards mobile applications require privilege escalation. 
By preventing the execution of the app on a jail broken device this threat is effectively 
mitigated. Still, it is good to remember that if there was a trustworthy way of identifying 
a jail broken phone, the operating system provider would most likely already be utiliz-
ing this mechanism in the operating system core. 
Obfuscation of the app binaries is a mechanism of protecting the application source 
code and internal logic from attackers who want to decompile the application to under-
stand its internal workings. Basically the obfuscator mangles the original binary before 
compilation, strips all variable names and replaces them with nonsense to make it diffi-
cult to understand what the program is doing. Although obfuscation makes it more diffi-
cult to understand the application, it is far from being effective. With enough effort it is 
possible to reverse engineer the obfuscated source. This also hints that anything that is 
published in to the open markets, will be opened, examined and exposed. So the securi-
ty of the application must not be based on the assumption that the application could hide 
the security related logic (i.e. security by obscurity). As mentioned in the previous chap-
ter regarding local storage, never leave an encryption key in to the application binary 
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and expect an obfuscator to protect that. 
Prevent debug output from default console log. Debug logging is a development time 
activity which is needed to for various reasons, for example to print out stack traces, 
understand error root causes, verify that the application works as intended and detect 
details of unexpected activities. Before the app is published to the market places it is 
very important to completely disable debug logging, otherwise it will expose an easy to 
use attack vector. Default debug log might be shared (depending on mobile platform) 
and open to be read by any application. The worst case scenario would be an application 
printing user credentials to the debug log where they can be read by another malicious 
application without even violating the operating systems security policy. 
Build server-side mechanisms to block access from specific App version or mobile oper-
ating system versions. Once the mobile app has been published and downloaded by the 
user there is no direct control left for the publisher. The application can be removed 
from the app store, but it can not be removed from the end user device. Therefore it is 
important to build sufficient server side controls to limit the access as desired. For ex-
ample in the situations where a major vulnerability has been discovered from the pub-
lished application, the publisher can block the usage of the app via the server side con-
trols. Additionally the publisher should give instructions to the users to download the 
latest application version containing all necessary fixes. Similar control should be in 
place regarding the operating system version which is running the application. In case 
of severe operating system vulnerabilities the service provider should have the capabil-
ity of blocking and informing users who are running the application on a vulnerable 
operating system. 
Avoid implementing authorization and critical business rules in the mobile apps. Busi-
ness logic should be implemented in the apps only for convenience reasons. All critical 
business and authorization rules should be implemented server side. As mentioned ear-
lier in chapter 4.5 there is no way to build a perfectly protected mobile application that 
the server could trust. A service should provide the resources that the app is allowed to 
operate and all important business rules should be executed server side. Similar rules 
can be implemented and replicated in the mobile apps for convenience reasons. These 
reasons might for example relate to being able provide optimal user experience via in-
stant feedback and guidance. 
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Implement device enrolment [ECB13]. Requiring the user to actively register the devic-
es to be used with the services enables better monitoring and risk assessment to be per-
formed. Registered device increases the strength of subsequent authentications since the 
information regarding the device provides an additional factor to the authentication 
(something that the user possesses). Device enrolment also provides additional security 
for traditional one factor authentication solutions such as username + password. These 
light authentication solutions might be used for viewing data or executing low risk op-
erations. Stealing a static username and password will not be sufficient for authenticat-
ing to the Bank since the request has to come from a pre-registered device. 
6 Suggested solution for offering secure Web Services for 
Mobile Applications 
This chapter describes a logical
8
 architecture for providing secure Web Services for 
Mobile Applications based on the information and key findings presented in previous 
chapters. The chapter starts by introducing the conceptual high level architecture of how 
applications and systems are grouped and continues to drills down deeper in to the spe-
cific characteristics mobile applications and REST API architecture. Eventually the pre-
sented components are mapped in to a physical network and runtime environment. The 
reasoning for many of the architectural decisions is justified in the following sections 
which introduce the concrete security solutions built on top of the selected architecture. 
After the architectural description of the solution the selected security and authentica-
tion related use cases are described and explained in more detail using UML sequence 
diagrams. Functional use cases such as “execute action” or “view information” are not 
described; the aim is to describe the general frame which enables all type of functional 
use cases to be implemented.  
Certain features and capabilities which are the most relevant in the mobile and security 
context are explained and described in more detail, and the basic “client - server” Web 
architecture is given less focus. As this chapter provides a logical description of the ar-
chitecture, it is not a detailed implementation guideline for an individual system, but a 
high level blue print that can be used as the foundation for multiple solutions requiring 
similar (security) characteristics. 
                                                 
8
 As defined by The Open Group in Togaf 9.1 Enterprise architecture development framework, a logical 
architecture refers to an implementation-independent description of the architecture [Ope11] 
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Capabilities and requirements listed previous chapters are mapped in to the presented 
solution to explain where they should implement to provide the benefits and protection 
described earlier. Last section in this chapter analyses the results achieved and evaluates 
the strengths and weaknesses of the suggested solution.  
6.1 Architectural description of the solution 
Based on the findings in previous chapters the decision is to use RESTful Web Services 
with JSON as the message format when creating services aimed for mobile service con-
sumers. Most significant deciding factor for this recommendation is chapter five which 
describes the native support for different communication protocols in the mobile plat-
forms. If the services are targeted to mobile consumers, they must be offered in a format 
that is convenient to use and supported by the mobile platforms. JSON is recommended 
due to less heavyweight processing and smallest bandwidth usage. 
Following sections describe the architecture from different abstraction levels and view-
points starting from a high level conceptual architecture and drilling down to the more 
specific mobile application and REST API architecture.  
6.1.1 Conceptual architecture 
The mobile channel consists of five major groups of applications and systems which are 
described below in Figure 6.1.1. These groups may contain several applications and 
systems which perform similar responsibilities within a certain limited context. 
Mobile 
Applications
REST APIs SOA Services
Core Business 
Applications
Supporting services
 
Figure 6.1.1 Conceptual architecture of the mobile channel  
 
Mobile Applications are the end-user applications that can be downloaded from the app 
stores and installed in to the customer’s mobile device. These applications provide the 
user interface and associated application logic to communicate towards the Bank by 
consuming one or more RESTful Web Services.  
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REST APIs are responsible for providing a consistent RESTful facade which exposes to 
the internal core systems that provide the actual business functionality. This layer is also 
responsible for all of the channel specific security functions such as session establish-
ment, request authentication including validation and coarse grained authorization. 
SOA services are responsible for publishing an internal Web Services layer which pro-
vides access to core business applications regardless of the implementation or runtime 
environment of the Core Business Application. SOA services are typically realized in an 
Enterprise Service Bus (ESB), but may also contain individual services which fulfill the 
internal SOA requirements of the organization regarding self-containment, management, 
monitoring and common data types. Most of the subsequent sequence diagrams in fol-
lowing sections omit the SOA layer since in this context it only provides connectivity 
and adaptation to the core business applications without performing relevant business 
logic. 
Core Business Applications provide the actual business functionality. They are shared 
between several different channels such as mobile, Web, Contact Centers, ATM’s and 
physical branch offices. Core Business applications contain authentication systems, ac-
count ledgers, payment systems and many more. They are a heterogeneous collection of 
applications running in various runtime environments and implemented in different pro-
gramming languages. 
Supporting services  such as the online app stores, intrusion detection (or prevention) 
systems, audit logging, statistics gathering tools, runtime monitoring and management 
tools are utilized throughout the layers but they don’t have a significant role in shaping 
the architecture. Details regarding the supporting services are not described in more 
detail in the subsequent sections as they are not highly relevant in the context of build-
ing secure Web Services. 
6.1.2 Mobile Application Architecture 
This section describes the high level architecture for the mobile applications in a mobile 
platform agnostic way. The main goal of the architecture is to separate concerns so that 
the applications achieve a high degree of maintainability in the ever changing environ-
ment. Presentation layer, Business layer, Resource Access Layer and Local Data 
Sources are decoupled and abstracted so that changes in one area should not reflect to 
others. Security is a cross cutting concern and all components within the layered archi-
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tecture might have security related responsibilities. Figure 6.1.2 describes the layers and 
some of the main components within these layers. 
  Mobile App
Platform Data Sources
Presentation Layer
Se
cu
ri
ty
Business Layer
Resource Access Layer
Local Data Sources
Run Time Cache
Secure Key Storage
User Preferences
and Settings
REST API
Access
Components
Local Data
Access
Components
Native UI
Components
Alternative Input
Components
Business Logic
Components
 
Figure 6.1.2 Layered Mobile Application architecture 
 
Presentation Layer: Separate presentation layer components enable the redesign and 
change of UI design without touching components below in other layers. UI compo-
nents handle the designed functionality of various use cases depending on the exact re-
quirements and content included in the application. Additional input mechanisms, for 
example microphone used for speech recognition, a barcode reader or an image scanner 
utilizing the phone camera, might hook directly with some presentation layer UI com-
ponents. 
Business Layer: Separate business layer components enable the change of business rules 
without touching the components in other layers. Business components are business rule 
managers that handle business rules per use case. Session, state and authentication man-
agement as well as some helper and worker components may be considered to be part of 
the business layer as well. 
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Resource Access Layer contains Data Access Components which enable fetching data 
from different data sources without upper layer components needing to know where the 
data is served from. Data Access Components handle access to the app specific in-
device and off-device data sources. Some resource access helper and worker compo-
nents may be considered to be part of resource access layer as well. A dedicated Data 
Access Component is responsible for the communications towards the Bank REST 
API’s. 
Local Data Sources contains volatile and persistently stored data that is stored locally in 
the mobile device. The data sources can be provided by the platform or created within 
the application. For example the platform specific key store is used for storing the secret 
keys. Session related data is cached in a volatile runtime cache provided by the applica-
tion to avoid unnecessary network communications. Optional user preferences related to 
the application or any other data needed in offline-mode is stored in a persistent store. 
Sensitive data can be stored only in encrypted format and the encryption key must not 
reside within the device.  
Security: Security is a cross-cutting layer. The components or the features of the Securi-
ty layer are included and implemented in the relevant components of each layer. Some 
security solutions might cross all layers and might not require modification in other 
components. Certificate pinning and jailbreak detection elaborated in Section 5.5 are 
examples which belong to the Security layer. 
6.1.3 REST API Architecture 
This section describes the REST API architecture in a platform or framework agnostic 
manner for offering the secure Web Services. Key building blocks and functionalities 
are grouped as modules or packages which need to be implemented according to the 
principles defined by the selected RESTful framework.  
In the simplest form a REST API consists of two pipelines, one for request and one for 
response. These pipelines then have associated actions which are executed step by step. 
As originally described by Mr. Fielding, a REST interaction resembles “pipes and fil-
ters” architecture style although it has two independent processing streams for the re-
quest and response [Fie00]. The data within a stream may be processed and transformed 
by several filters before it is dispatched forward to the corresponding backend destina-
tion or back to the customer. In this section the REST API applications are described 
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with pipes and filters based approach which enables the division of request and response 
pipelines in to multiple independent steps that need to be executed to achieve the de-
sired functionality. 
To enable strong decoupling between the user authentication solution and business ser-
vices the REST API is divided in to two separate applications called “Authentication 
REST API” and “Business REST API”. Other reasons for creating two independent ap-
plications relate to the nature and life cycle of the applications. Authentication related 
services are expected to be fairly stable and have significantly slower release cycle 
while the business related services will be incrementally developed and new services 
and new versions of the existing services will be frequently published.  
The division in two separate REST API applications can also be seen as a more future 
proof approach. When the next business case for a new application requiring a REST 
API emerges, there is a fully reusable authentication solution in place and the develop-
ment can focus on developing a new business service for the desired functionality. Fur-
ther reasoning for the division is explained in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 which describe the 
token based request authentication solution that supports multiple user authentication 
mechanisms. 
Both of the REST API applications will contain several operations, typically one or 
more per use case. These operations will contain operation specific logic and common 
processing logic that is executed for all operations. Figures 6.1.3a and 6.1.3b describe 
the two REST API applications and present their request and response pipelines with the 
associated filters. Both applications share a lot of similar characteristics and responsibil-
ities, but there is clear difference in them. Authentication REST API related operations 
are only used for initiating a session. Operations provided Business REST API require 
that a session has been previously established and that the request belongs to an existing 
session.  
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Figure 6.1.3a Authentication REST API, request and response pipelines with associated filters 
 
Authentication REST API Request Pipeline in Figure 6.1.3a contains the following 
filters: 
Request parser is the first filter to be executed for all incoming request messages. It will 
read the incoming HTTP request and parse the HTTP headers, URL and the optional 
JSON payload in to objects that the application can process. The parser must be hard-
ened to resists Denial-Of-Service attacks and it should limit the maximum amount of 
memory used for processing an individual request. Hardening is necessary since a mali-
cious request message might be huge in size to consume all memory of the server, have 
faulty JSON structure or contain embedded JavaScript or excessive nested structures. 
HMAC Verification is an optional filter. It will be executed for authentication related 
operations after the initial device registration has been performed when there is a 
Hashed Message Authentication Code to be verified. Device registration and HMAC 
protection are elaborated in the next sections. For the device registration process no de-
vice authentication is performed, only user authentication towards the Core Authentica-
tion System will be done. This will be described in detail in Section 6.6. 
App Lifecycle Management is a mandatory filter which is executed for all operations in 
the Authentication REST API. The filter will inspect User-Agent and custom HTTP 
headers provided by the Mobile Application to ensure that the application and mobile 
operating system versions are allowed to access the REST API. Vulnerable application 
or operating system versions can be blocked from the service for security reasons. The 
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filter can utilize both whitelisting for stating the explicitly accepted versions or black-
listing for explicitly rejected versions. 
Request validators are operation specific filters which ensure that the request format 
including HTTP headers, URL and request payload and parameters are according to the 
business rules associated with the operation. Request validators will also detect and pre-
vent SQL, XML and HTTP header injections. 
Request Transformers are operation specific filters which will transform the incoming 
JSON based request to the format understood by the relevant SOA services that provide 
connectivity towards the Core Business Applications. This is typically a JSON to SOAP 
conversion but JSON can be transformed to other formats when required by the Core 
Business Applications. 
Backend Connectors are operation specific filters which are responsible for routing and 
the actual communications towards the target system for the specific operation with the 
appropriate protocol. Backend connectors must implement service level monitoring and 
throttle the traffic towards the core systems according to predefined system specific 
limitations to limit the impact of DDoS attacks. 
Authentication REST API response pipeline in Figure 6.1.3a contains the following 
filters: 
Response parsers are operations specific filters with one-to-one match towards the 
backend connectors. Response parsers will parse the response received in to a format 
natively understood by the REST API application. 
Response transformers are operation specific filters which will transform the received 
response message in to the JSON format to be returned to the mobile application ac-
cording to the agreed interface specification. Response transformers may filter out ex-
cessive data or detailed error codes which are not relevant in the mobile context. Simi-
larly sensitive information which should not leave the internal network might be filtered 
out or encrypted. 
Security Token creator is an optional filter that can be used by several different user 
authentication related operations. Security Token Creator will create a JSON Web Token 
based security token according the definitions that are detailed later in Section 6.4 after 
a successful user authentication. 
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Figure 6.1.3b Business REST API, request and response pipelines with associated filters 
 
Business REST API request pipeline consists of the following filters: 
Request parser filter has the same responsibilities as described with Authentication 
REST API for parsing the incoming HTTP request message. 
Security Token Verification is a mandatory filter for all operations in Business REST 
API. It verifies that the request belongs to an established session. The filter will perform 
security token validation according to the description that will be introduced in Sections 
6.3 and 6.4. The filter might make call-outs to external systems to verify that the token 
has not been revoked. 
HMAC Verification is a mandatory filter for all operations. It will verify the HMAC 
signature covering the request message using the secret key embedded in the Session 
Security Token. This process will be elaborated in more detail in Section 6.5. 
Request authorization is a common filter used by all operations to ensure that the cus-
tomer is authorized to perform the activity he has requested. Request authorization filter 
will typically contact a remote read-only authorization database. 
Request validators are operation specific filters which have the same validation respon-
sibilities as described for Authentication REST API. 
Request Transformers are operation specific filters which have the same responsibilities 
for transforming the request in to appropriate format for the related backend system as 
described for Authentication REST API. 
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Backend connectors are operation specific filters which have the same responsibilities 
for contacting appropriate backend systems as described for Authentication REST API.  
Business REST API response pipeline contains the following filters: 
Response parsers have the same responsibility of parsing the received response message 
in to a format natively understood by the REST API application as described for Au-
thentication 
Response transformers are operation specific filters which have the same generic re-
sponsibilities as described for Authentication REST API. 
6.1.4 Physical architecture 
The previously introduced application components are mapped in to a physical runtime 
environment in typical multilayered security oriented network architecture in Figure 
6.1.4. The suggested solution is not limited to specific network architecture but can be 
adapted based on the existing network landscape. 
Components are isolated in to designated network zones based on their usage and the 
relevant communication needs. The network zones are isolated by firewalls. Internal 
application layers including REST API’s and SOA layer are load balanced and clus-
tered. External load balancer is also responsible for the SSL connection termination and 
it is connected to an Intrucion Detection or an Intrucion Prevention System (IDS) or 
(IDP). IDS is a passive system that receives a broadcast of all of the network traffic that 
passes through the load balancer and it can trigger alerts based on preconfigured pack-
age signatures.  
Runtime environments or operating systems for the applications are not specified. All 
modern server operating systems are able to host REST APIs implemented with various 
different tools. Vendors like IBM, Intel, Layer 7 and Vordel among others offer hard-
ened appliance based server environments that are designed to operate as REST gate-
ways within the DMZ network. Many of the products include hardware crypto accelera-
tion and advanced threat protection capabilities making them worthy of a consideration. 
Supporting tools which reside in the bottom of the figure inside the Management net-
work are shared and used by multiple other applications in addition to Mobile Channel. 
They collect and receive data from application and infrastructure components in all lay-
ers of the network. 
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Figure 6.1.4 Physical (network) architecture with the primary infrastructure components and applications 
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The Common Log Repository on the bottom of the picture gathers audit log events from 
all customer interactions with all of the systems which participate in the end-to-end pro-
cess. System management tools which also reside in the Management Network are used 
to operate and monitor the running production environment. The last supporting appli-
cation is the Statistics gathering application. It will collect statistics from all relevant 
aspects of the application use as needed by the organization.  
6.2 Mobile device and mobile app registration 
All of the selected mobile platforms are focused on a single user paradigm. There is a 
single user account on the device and it is not possible change the user account without 
reinitializing the device. The fact that the device and specific the app in the device are 
intended to be used only by a single person opens up some new possibilities for improv-
ing the security of the authentication process.  
This improvement can be achieved by requiring the customer to registering the device 
and app combination by using strong authentication. The reason why both device and 
the app need to be registered is related to the fact that in the future the Bank might re-
lease new applications for other purposes and it might be necessary to be able to distin-
guish for which specific applications the device has been authorized.  
Device and app registration will be a prerequisite for taking the application in to use. A 
new identifier is generated for this combination in the registration process and used as 
an additional authentication factor in all subsequent communications. This feature also 
enables new use cases where the customer might be able to retrieve non-sensitive per-
sonal information only by launching the application and using the one factor device 
authentication to identify himself.  
Figure 6.2 describes the enrolment process for device and app registration. The user is 
identified by using strong electronic authentication. An identifier for the device and app 
combination is generated and the service provider stores the identifier in to a device 
registry system for later use. The identifier will be retrieved from the device registry in 
subsequent logins to verify that the user is using the application in an authorized device.  
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Figure 6.2 enrolment flow 
Following steps described in Figure 6.2 should be executed in the enrolment scenario:  
1. User selects to enroll his device and application to be used with the services and 
performs a strong authentication. Strong authentication credentials and relevant 
information concerning the application are sent to the Authentication REST API. 
2. Origin and version of the app is authenticated to make sure that this is the origi-
nal app published and not a third party malware/phishing app and that the ver-
sion is recent enough to be used. 
3. Customer is identified by sending his/her credentials to the Core Authentication 
System. 
4. Core Authentication System returns the confirmed user identity. 
5. Device and app identifier is generated. It is an aftificial unique identifier for the 
app and device combination. 
6. User ID and device and app identifier are sent to the Device Registry system. 
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7. Success of the registration operation is confirmed. 
8. Device and app identifier is returned to the mobile application. There might be 
several alternative flows regarding how the identifier is returned. In the simplest 
form it is sent over the wire with the response message. To enhance the security, 
the identifier could also be sent as SMS message, or achieve maximal security 
(and lowest possible user experience) it could be sent as a registered letter.  
9. Mobile Application stores the identifier by using the appropriate secure storage 
space provided by the operating system, such as a key chain or a key store. 
After the enrolment the mobile application will always provide this identifier, or a refer-
ence to the identifier, when the customer performs an authentication to use the applica-
tion. The identifier is compared to the information stored in the Device Registry to veri-
fy that the user has authorized this device and app combination to be used.  
There are two ways of delivering the identifier with the login request messages after 
registration: 1) attaching the identifier as plain text as part of the request for the service 
to compare the identifier to the one stored in the backend database or 2) calculating a 
cryptographic hash from the identifier and only delivering a reference to the identifier 
and the calculated hash sum over the wire to the server. If the server can recalculate the 
same hash value by using the stored device and app identifier referenced in the request, 
it means that the request is coming from an authenticated device.  
Option 2 is clearly a more secure alternative and more complex as well since the identi-
fier never leaves the device. Even if the SSL connection would be compromised there is 
no way to capture the identifier. Only a local attack targeted for the specific application 
in the mobile device could jeopardize the identifier.  
Full device authentication scenario as a part of the standard user authentication flow 
will be described in Section 6.5, before that certain other relevant aspects of the authen-
tication solution are elaborated in more detail. 
Mobile devices are prone to loss and theft and therefore certain supporting services are 
needed to complement the solution. It is essential to offer a backup channel for example 
via phone based contact center or a Web based solutions for de-activating sold, lost or 
stolen devices. Enabling self service capabilities for the device management should 
lower the amount of customer service and support required. 
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By introducing the previously described device and app registration process an addi-
tional authentication factor has been established (something that the user possesses).  
6.3 Token based security solution for session management  
As identified in Section 4.3, a self-contained token based security solution is the natural 
replacement for server side session identifiers generally utilized by browser based Web 
applications. This section describes the generic characteristics of a token based solution 
before the next section applies the solution in practice. The token which is used as a 
proof of an authenticated session is called Session Security Token (SST) in this context. 
In essence the SST is a replacement for the authenticated user id. It can also be seen as 
an authorization ticket proving that this user is authorized to access the services that 
require previous authentication. The token must be properly protected, contain a unique 
token-identifier, authenticated user identity, Time-To-Live (TTL) for the session, au-
thentication mechanism used to obtain the token, information regarding who issued the 
token and how the token is protected . Additional information can be appended as nec-
essary. If the same entity issues and later verifies to the token, information regarding 
keys and algorithms used may be omitted to save bandwidth used when passing the to-
ken over the network. 
The SST shall not reveal the user id in clear text in case it would be captured from the 
wire, or from the running memory of the mobile device. It must be resistant to any tam-
pering attempts and have a limited lifetime. Limited lifetime and tampering protection 
can be achieved by using a Time-To-Live timestamp and digital signature covering the 
entire token content. Appropriate TTL should be evaluated based on the service risk 
level. A financial service used for executing transactions might have a considerably 
lower TTL than an informational service which is to be used only for viewing data. 
Confidentiality can be achieved by encrypting the entire token, that way it is also safe 
for the client application to persistently store the token, at least for the duration of the 
session. Since the token will be sent to the service with every single request, the size 
should be minimized. Therefore it is important to select the optimal format for the mo-
bile context, leave out unnecessary information and compress the token before encryp-
tion. 
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The token format is an agreement between the issuer and verifier. A typical established 
security token standard would be SAML 2.0 assertions which provide a wide range of 
expressive means to describe a security token [Can05]. A more modern and lightweight 
alternative is JSON Web Token (JWT) where the specification is still in draft level 
[JBS14]. JWT is a simple JSON based security token that can be digitally signed using 
JSON Web Signatures (JWS) which is also IETF standard draft [JBS15]. Since the to-
ken is going to be issued and verified by the same organization (and possibly even by 
the same application) the format selection is not a crucial issue. Selected token format 
will not be reflected outside of the REST API applications. JWT tokens are more ver-
bose which fits well the mobile usage and since JSON is used as the messaging format 
for the actual Web Services it is the natural selection for the token format. 
To adhere to best practices regarding session management there should be a possibility 
to revoke a previously issued token when the user does an active log-out before the ses-
sion is set to expire [OWA13]. Active log out is one of the challenges of the token based 
approach. Since by default the token is self-describing and valid to the end of the TTL 
period there is no way to revoke a previously issued token without building additional 
logic and services for this purpose. Two primary alternatives exist; keep track of all is-
sued tokens and invalidate them as requested or build a revocation list for the revoked 
tokens.  
Keeping track of all issued token would defy the purpose of self-describing tokens and 
closely correspond to server side sessions. A more RESTful approach would be to build 
a revocation list that contains all of revoked the token-identifiers, following similar log-
ic as a Certificate Revocation List in Public Key Infrastructure. Revoked token identifi-
ers must be added to the token revocation list and one part of the token validation pro-
cess must be to do a look-up to the token revocation list with the identifier of the token 
to be validated. If the token identifier is found from the revocation list, access must be 
rejected even if the TTL and signature of the token are valid. Since the tokens have a 
limited life time, they only need to be stored on the revocation list for the maximum 
duration of the token life time.  
Furthermore the revocation list must not be stored on the REST gateway server per-
forming the validation. Storing the list in the REST gateway servers would require syn-
chronization of the list between the nodes, decrease scaling capabilities and be against 
the RESTful principles. Transient nature of revoked token identifiers suggests that a 
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memory cache based solution with extreme performance for read operations and which 
by default allows a predefined lifetime for the information, might be a good realization 
platform for the Token Revocation List. 
Since the token has a predefined limited lifetime, the customer session is fixed in length 
by nature. A too short maximum session duration might be seen as an inconvenience 
and on the contrary issuing tokens with an exceptionally lifetime could be considered as 
a security issue. The solution is to offer tokens with a rather short Time-To-Live limit 
and offer a service for renewing the token when necessary. This renewal service should 
also utilize the token revocation list to ensure that the old token is blocked to prevent 
parallel sessions. The Mobile Application must implement local session management 
and renew the token as necessary based on user activity. 
Use of cryptographically protected security tokens enables the services to be stateless 
regarding authentication and session management. The tradeoff is increased CPU usage 
as there are several cryptographic operations involved in the process (encryption, de-
cryption and signature generation and validation) and increased request message size 
since the security token must be attached to every single request message. The SST is 
bound to be larger in size than a traditional session cookie used with most Web applica-
tions.  
However CPU intensity is not a huge concern as it can be addressed in several ways. 
There is special hardware available which is targeted for extreme performance in cryp-
tographic operations. Another possible approach to address the increased CPU usage is 
to utilize excellent scaling characteristics of the solution. There is no dependency be-
tween the issuer and verifier of the security token as long as they share the same crypto-
graphic keys used in the process generating and the tokens. This enabling horizontal 
scaling of the solution by adding parallel processing nodes to the REST API layer hid-
den behind a load balancer. 
6.4 Flexible solution for supporting multiple user authentication 
mechanisms 
As described in Chapter 2 there is a requirement to be able to support multiple user au-
thentication mechanisms. Ideally this will be achieved by separating the user authentica-
tion from request authentication. When user authentication and request authentication 
are decoupled there is no need for an individual service to know the details regarding 
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multiple supported user authentication mechanisms. Previously presented security token 
based approach is well suited to facilitate this requirement as will be demonstrated. 
The solution is to divide the services in to two categories; authentication services which 
are responsible for user authentication and business services which cover all the rest of 
the services which are used after authentication. These categories correspond to the Au-
thentication REST API application and Business REST API applications presented pre-
viously.  
Each authentication mechanism (one time codes, hardware security token or mobile 
application based) needs a dedicated authentication service in the Authentication REST 
API. The service must implement the specific flow related to the authentication mecha-
nism. As a result of a successful authentication the identity of the customer is confirmed 
and a cryptographically protected Session Security Token is issued as described in the 
previous section. This SST is attached to all subsequent requests messages which are 
sent to the business services that reside in the Business REST API to prove that the re-
quest belongs to a valid session.  
The combined request and user authentication process is illustrated in the following 
UML sequence diagram in Figure 6.4. Previously presented device registration and au-
thentication is omitted from this diagram to illustrate the principle in a simplistic man-
ner. 
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Figure 6.4 simplified login sequence diagram illustrating how user authentication (red dashed line) is 
decoupled from the business services (blue dashed line).  
Following is a step by step explanation of the flow in Figure 6.4. To keep the illustration 
simple the SOA layer and error and exception flows have been omitted.  
1. Customer initiates the login flow by providing the credentials required by the 
authentication mechanism by sending a request message to the Authentication 
REST API. 
2. Authentication REST API transforms the authentication request in to the format 
and protocol understood the Core Authentication System. 
3. If the credentials provided by the customer are correct, confirmed user identity is 
returned from Core Authentication System.  
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4. Upon receiving the information of a successful authentication Authentication 
REST API will generate a Session Security Token according to the previous de-
scription containing the user identity, validity period (TTL) of the session and 
other user related information. The SST is then digitally signed for tampering 
protection, compressed to save bandwidth in subsequent transactions and en-
crypted for confidentiality. 
5. SST is returned to the Mobile Application as base64 encoded string and can be 
now used in all subsequent request messages towards the Business REST API. 
6. After successfully completing the authentication flow, the customer is logged in 
and can select to invoke any of the services provided by the mobile application. 
The basic principle is always the same, mobile application generates a request 
message and attaches the SST in to a HTTP header. In this example the customer 
selects ExecuteTransaction operation which sends a request towards the Busi-
ness REST API. The request contains the session security token and parameters 
filled in by the customer. 
7. Business REST API receives the request and extracts the Session Security Token 
from the HTTP headers. The SST is then decompressed and decrypted. After the 
token is in clear text the signature is verified and validity of the Time-To-Live 
limit is verified.  
8. Business REST API does a look-up to the Token Revocation List to make sure 
that the token as not been revoked.  
9. Token Revocation List returns information regarding the revocation status of the 
token. Once token status has been successfully validated, the request is authenti-
cated. Identity of the customer is known and the flow may continue to next 
steps. 
10. After the request has been authenticated Business REST API transforms the in-
coming request to a format and protocol understood by the Core Business Sys-
tem. The user identity extracted from the SST and the received parameters are 
inserted to the request which is sent to the appropriate destination. 
11. Core Business System executes the transaction requested by the customer. Exe-
cuting a transaction in this context can refer to any type of business operation 
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from fetching data to executing a change. 
12. Business REST API receives the response from Core Business System and trans-
forms it into JSON format. 
13. Business REST API finalizes the flow by returning the response to the Mobile 
Application. 
Presented service architecture provides a strong decoupling between user authentication 
and request authentication as described in the requirements in Chapter 2. There is no 
limitation on the number or types of supported user authentication mechanisms that can 
be supported with the described solution. 
6.5 Message level protection with Hashed Message Authentication 
Codes 
Previously described device and app registration and security token based session man-
agement are complemented with one more fundamental security related capability, 
Hashed Message Authentication Codes. Use of HMACs will guarantee message integri-
ty even in the worst case scenario of a serious SSL vulnerability which would compro-
mise confidentiality. It will also serve as an additional authentication factor in request 
and user authentication. As explained in Chapter 4.3 there are no standardized digital 
signature schemes available to be used with RESTful Web Services with JSON content, 
therefore a custom solution is required.  
The Hashed Message Authentication is generated by the Mobile Application by execut-
ing a HMAC function as follows: digest=HMAC(request, key). The resulting digest is 
sent over the network with the original request .The service that receives the request 
will do the same calculation and compare if the resulting digest matches with the digest 
received in the request message. 
In reality the process is a bit more complex than the previous description. As a prerequi-
site a key generation and sharing process is needed to share the secret key between the 
client and server. To ensure that the HMAC calculation produces identical results both 
in the client and server the request message must be normalized before the calculation. 
A canonicalization algorithm for normalizing the request must be executed. The canoni-
calization algorithm defines which parts of HTTP headers, request URL and request 
payload are included in to the calculation and how they must be ordered, encoded and 
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concatenated to generate one long string that represents the entire request. For validat-
ing the HMAC exactly same steps need to be taken to produce an identical result.  
A single deviation in any part of the process executed by the client or the server will 
most likely result a deviation in the digests. As typical with HMACs, there is no output 
from error situations. The HMAC digests either match or do not match and there will be 
no additional information available of the reason why they do not match. Rigorous test-
ing is required to make sure that the service and clients perform exactly same calcula-
tion logic in all scenarios. The benefit of the solution is the improved security of the 
end-to-end system as it contains an additional independent layer of security on top of 
transport layer security. However use of HMAC does not provide message level protec-
tion due to the strong coupling of the message and transport protocol in RESTful archi-
tectures. 
Section 6.2 described a mobile device and app registration process. The process con-
tains a common element with the suggested HMAC solution. In Section 6.2 the com-
mon element was referred as “device and app identifier”, and in this chapter as “secret 
key”. To simplify the solution and limit overhead of key management it is possible to 
use a single identifier/key for both purposes.  
The only requirement for the format of the “device and app identifier” is that it is unique 
by a reasonable high probability. Requirement for the secret key used with the HMAC is 
that it is unique by a reasonable high probability and that in addition the minimum key 
length should match the block size of the selected HMAC algorithm. Commonly used 
HMAC-SHA algorithms also accept keys that are longer than the block size, and there is 
no upper limit for the length of “device and app identifier” so clearly these two can be 
combined regardless of the block size of the selected HMAC algorithm.  
In Figure 6.5 on the following page the HMAC solution is combined with the previous-
ly presented security token and device authentication approaches.  
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Figure 6.5 Full user authentication and request authentication flows with HMAC protection.  
HMAC generation and validation process requires following steps described in Figure 
6.5: 
0. As a prerequisite, the mobile app must have a secret key which is also known by 
the server which will verify the Hashed Message Authentication Code. The en-
rolment process to obtain the secret key was described in Section 6.2. 
1. User selects to login into the application and provides his credentials for the se-
lected authentication mechanism. The mobile app generates a RESTful request 
with JSON payload containing the credentials. Request goes through a canoni-
calization process to normalize and concatenate all request content including 
HTTP headers, request URL, request payload (if present) in to a single string.  
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A SHA256 HMAC digest is calculated from the canonicalized request with cus-
tomer’s secret key. The key is stored by the mobile application in the platform 
specific key container provided by the operating system. The resulting digest is 
attached to the HTTP headers of the request with a reference to the key used. 
The request is now ready to be sent to the service. 
2. The request containing user’s credentials, calculated HMAC digest and the iden-
tifier for the key used is sent to the Authentication REST API to a service re-
sponsible for the selected authentication method. 
3. After receiving the request Authentication REST API transforms the request in 
to appropriate format and calls the core authentication system to verify user’s 
identity.  
4. Verified user identity is returned from Core Authentication System. 
5. Authentication REST API creates a new request towards the Device Registry to 
fetch the associated secret key. The request contains the verified user identity 
from the Core Authentication System and the secret key identifier (HmacKeyId) 
from the original request. 
6. Device Registry returns the user’s secret key as the response. 
7. Authentication REST API will execute exactly same canonicalization process 
for the received request as was done by the Mobile Application in Step 1 to cre-
ate a single string representing the entire request
9
. Authentication REST API will 
calculate a SHA256 HMAC digest from the canonicalized request and compare 
it to the HMAC digest received from the customer. If the digests match, the re-
quest is coming from an authorized device holding the correct secret key. 
8. Authentication REST API will generate a Session Security Token which con-
tains the confirmed user identity, Time-To-Live (i.e. the validity period of the 
session), authentication mechanism used and the user’s secret key for subse-
quent use. Session Security Token is digitally signed, compressed and encrypted. 
                                                 
9
 Extra care must be taken to make sure that only the original http headers are taken in to the calculation 
and that they are used in the same exact order as in when signing the request. HTTP 1.1/RFC2616 does 
not guarantee that the original order of HTTP headers is preserved. Various network nodes such as proxy 
servers typically inject additional headers to the request while in transit. Any deviation to the original 
canonicalization process regardless related to content or order of elements will cause the HMAC 
comparison to fail. 
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9. Session Security Token is returned to the Mobile Application and the customer is 
now logged in. 
10. User selects to execute specific functionality within the application. Mobile Ap-
plication will generate a RESTful request, and a HMAC digest covering the re-
quest message by using the secret key stored in the platform specific key con-
tainer. Digest and the previously received Session Security Token will be at-
tached to the HTTP headers of the request. 
11. Mobile Application sends the request to Business Service REST API. 
12. Business REST API verifies the delivered security token by decrypting, de-
compressing, validating the digital signature and by checking that the TTL indi-
cates that the token has not expired. Business REST API also extracts the con-
firmed user identity and secret key from the Session Security Token. 
13. Business REST API verifies the HMAC covering the request message by exe-
cuting the previously described canonicalization and HMAC calculation process. 
14. Business REST API invokes IsTokenActive service from the Token Revocation 
List system to ensure that the token has not been revoked. 
15. Token Revocation List returns the information regarding token status (VAL-
ID/REVOKED). 
16. If the security token and HMAC verification processes succeed Business REST 
API will query the LDAP Authorization database to ensure that the customer is 
authorized to perform the operation he has initiated. 
17. Business REST API receives response for the authorization request. 
18. If the customer is authorized to perform the operation Business REST API will 
call the Core Business System to execute the functionality requested by the cus-
tomer. 
19. Core Business System will execute the requested functionality. 
20. Core Business System returns the response of the operation to Business REST 
API. 
21. Business REST API convers the received response message into JSON format 
and returns the response to Mobile Application. 
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The sequence described in Figure 6.2 contains a multiple of steps and there are several 
systems involved. This might cause some concerns regarding the performance and re-
sponse times of the solution. It is important to notice that user authentication is the more 
heavy weight operation where several remote calls are needed and the request authenti-
cation only contains simple external lookup operations. These lookups are used to check 
the token revocation list and to verify if the user is authorized for the operation. User 
authentication happens only once for each session while request authentication is per-
formed for every single service call after user authentication. This justifies the more 
heavyweight processing during user authentication. 
The HMAC based authentication fits well in to the proposed stateless service architec-
ture. In essence the HMAC provides two benefits, it proves that the customer is in pos-
session of a registered device and it also protects message integrity in case of SSL vul-
nerabilities. The solution does not conflict with either the device registration or the se-
curity token solution for session management but complements them.  
6.6 Mapping solutions to requirements 
This chapter is a summary of the various requirements presented throughout the thesis 
and corresponding architectural or technical solutions to address the requirement. Table 
6.6 gathers the requirements and presents the solutions. “From chapter” in the table in-
dicates where the requirement has originated from and “In Chapter” refers to the chapter 
that describes how the requirement is fulfilled. 
 
Requirement From 
Chapter 
Solution In 
Chapter 
R1: solution must 
scale horizontally 
for a rapidly in-
creasing user base 
2.2 Stateless services, security token approach. 
Local caching in mobile applications. 
6.1, 6.3 
R2: Multiple strong 
authentication solu-
tions must be sup-
ported 
2.6 Authentication service concept where a 
user authentication flow produces a 
“standard” security token. No limitation 
regarding the number of possible strong 
authentication solutions that could be inte-
grated to the system. 
6.4 
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Requirement From 
Chapter 
Solution In 
Chapter 
R3: Selected re-
mote communica-
tion protocol is 
supported by the 
selected mobile 
platforms 
2.1 RESTful Web Services with JSON sup-
ported by all of the selected mobile plat-
forms. 
5.4 
R4: Security solu-
tion supported in all 
mobile platforms 
2.1 All platforms have a secure storage for 
storing cryptographic keys. All platforms 
support Hashed Message Authentication 
Codes. 
5.4 
R5: Solution must 
fit in to the existing 
enterprise architec-
ture 
2.6 A new mobile channel is created to access 
the existing core business applications 
6.1 
R6: Existing core 
systems should not 
be modified 
2.6 Existing core systems will be exposed AS-
IS via RESTful facades. Only new poten-
tial core system is the customer mobile 
device + app registry which could poten-
tially be reused by other applications with 
mobile related needs (such as Push notifi-
cations). 
6.1 
R7: Implement au-
thentication 
2.2 Multiple strong authentication solutions 
supported, separate protocol for request 
authentication 
6.1 
R8: Implement au-
thorization 
2.2 Authorization must be performed by the 
core business systems and can optionally 
be performed also in the Mobile channel 
by propagating the authorization infor-
mation to a LDAP database 
6.1 
R9: Implement au-
diting 
2.2 All meaningful events are stored to a 
common log repository 
6.1 
R10: Enforce mes-
sage integrity 
2.2 HMAC which protects the RESTful mes-
sages 
6.5 
R11: Enforce mes-
sage confidentiality 
2.2 Use SSL for encrypting the message ex-
change on transport layer 
6.1.4 
R12: Address mo-
bile constraints 
(weak cpu, limited 
memory, limited 
bandwidth, chang-
ing IP address) 
2.7 RESTful Web Services with JSON is the 
most lightweight approach for remote 
communications. Session theft is not lim-
ited by fixating to an IP but based on the 
HMAC signatures where stolen messages 
only contain a signature without creden-
tials to reproduce on another message. 
3.4 
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Requirement From 
Chapter 
Solution In 
Chapter 
R13: Require cus-
tomers to register 
the mobile device 
they use for the 
service 
2.5 Mobile device + app registration by using 
strong electronic authentication requires 
that the customer authorizes the device 
where she/he intends to use the applica-
tion. 
6.2 
R14: adhere to rel-
evant legislation 
and regulation 
2.5 A broad topic that needs to be analyzed 
with Subject Matter Experts when creating 
the detailed implementation design. Out of 
scope for this thesis. 
- 
R15: the service 
must be able to 
block old or vulner-
able mobile app or 
mobile operating 
system versions 
5.5 App Lifecycle Management filter inspects 
the HTTP headers provided by the mobile 
application and grants or denies access by 
comparing those to a predefined configura-
tion (white listing allowed or black listing 
blocked version) 
6.1.3 
R16: mobile chan-
nel must throttle 
traffic so that the 
internal core sys-
tems are not dis-
turbed in a DDoS 
attack. 
4.5 Backend connectors responsible for com-
municating towards the internal core sys-
tems must implement service level moni-
toring and throttle traffic according to pre-
defined limitations. 
6.1.3 
R17: address all 
OWASP TOP 10 
mobile threats. 
2.3   
OWASP M1: Weak 
server side controls 
2.3 Hardened REST API. All functionality 
behind a strong electronic authentication. 
Security token and HMAC signatures for 
request authentication. 
6.1.3, 
6.5 
OWASP M2: 
Insecure data 
storage 
2.3 (2.5) Avoid local storage of data in the mobile 
device. Only use protected storage capabil-
ities of the mobile platforms when neces-
sary. Jailbreak protection to limit the appli-
cation from running in a compromised 
platform.  
5.5 
OWASP M3 Insuf-
ficient transport 
layer protection 
2.3 Always use SSL for communications, im-
plement certificate pinning for additional 
security 
6.1, 5.5 
OWASP M4: Unin-
tended data leakage 
2.3 Prevent debug log output in mobile apps. 
Disable platform specific default cache 
mechanisms to avoid data leakage. 
5.5 
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Requirement From 
Chapter 
Solution In 
Chapter 
OWASP M5: Poor 
Authorization and 
authentication 
2.3 Utilize proven strong electronic authentica-
tion mechanisms. Never implement local 
authentication in the mobile applications. 
Leave authorization decisions to server-
side controls. 
4.5, 6.1, 
6.5 
OWASP M6: Bro-
ken cryptography 
2.3 Review implementation with security ex-
perts, perform penetration testing and veri-
fy that all (encryption and signature) algo-
rithms are considered to be modern and 
secure. 
- 
OWASP M7: Client 
side injection 
2.3 Input validation should be performed to all 
input received by the mobile application 
(either coming from the user or reading a 
local database). Not addressed in this the-
sis.  
- 
OWASP M8: Secu-
rity decisions via 
untrusted inputs 
2.3 Related to inter process communications 
within the mobile platforms. Not addressed 
in this thesis. 
- 
OWASP M9: Im-
proper session han-
dling 
2.3 Use of HMAC signatures prevents session 
stealing. The secret that is used for signa-
ture generation is never transported over 
the wire. Session security token approach 
enabled more fine grained controls for ses-
sions and also enables active logout with 
the Token Revocation List. 
6.1.3, 
6.3, 6.4 
OWASP M10: lack 
of binary protection 
2.3 Obfuscation of source code before compi-
lation makes reverse engineering more 
difficult but not impossible. Jailbreak de-
tection helps to enforce that the application 
is only executed in a safe environment. 
5.5 
Table 6.10 Mapping solutions to the presented requirements 
 
6.7 Analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the solution 
The described solution which utilizes RESTful Web Services with JSON as the integra-
tion protocol could be described as the expected end result. SOAP based Web Services 
in the mobile context seem to be a rarity. Although technically nothing would prevent 
handcrafting the needed support, financially it wouldn’t be worth the effort.  
The token based security solution which enables any kind of credentials to be ex-
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changed for a standard token is a clever replacement for the server side sessions but it 
comes with the tradeoffs of increased request message size and additional server side 
processing. Heavy use of cryptography increases the need of the server side processing 
which can be mitigated by utilizing the scaling characteristics of solution or by using 
hardware crypto accelerators.  
Cryptographic processing will most likely slightly increase latency of the services, but 
still the most significant source of latency is the mobile network. The presented solution 
has succeeded to keep the invocations from the mobile app to the Web Services at a 
minimum level. Only in the initial authentication flow there is a need to perform two 
distinct operation at the same time, user authentication and fetching of data for the first 
screen after login. The security related use-cases described in the sequence diagrams 
contain several internal remote calls after receiving the request from the Mobile Appli-
cation. Those invocations happen within the internal network of the Bank and are not 
expected to introduce substantial latency as the Token Revocation List and the LDAP 
authorization database are located in the same network zone as the REST API. The op-
erations performed towards these systems are lightweight lookup operations typically 
returning a boolean or a single string. 
Hashed Message Authentication Code provide a strong solution for request authentica-
tion and request integrity protection. Embedding the secret key used for HMAC calcula-
tion inside of the Session Security Token fulfills the stateless requirement when the to-
ken and the message signature can be verified independently without maintaining server 
side state.  
The described security solution consists of independent building blocks: token based 
session management, device registration and Hashed Message Authentication Codes. 
All of the building blocks were used to craft a solution with very high security capabili-
ties, however they work independently as well. Based on the detailed requirements it 
would be possible to cherry pick only the mechanisms relevant for a particular solution. 
Ability for performing the active log-out requires a server side state to be maintained for 
the revoked tokens which could be seen as a violation of RESTful principles. The token 
revocation list also brings additional complexity to the solution. RESTful principles 
regarding caching will also be violated with the indirect object references described in 
Section 4.5. However since the sensitive nature of the information processed does not 
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allow any network level caching this can be seen as a minor issue.  
The described security solution offers strong protection for the communications be-
tween customer and the Bank, but provides limited protection for local attacks. Follow-
ing the mobile platform provider’s recommendations for building secure applications 
and extensive penetration testing are the best ways of enforcing local security of the 
apps. Making sure that the customer is using a non-compromized and recent enough 
version of the mobile operating system combined with the means described in chapter 
5.5 also provide a good mitigation scheme for the local attacks. 
Inventing new security solutions is not an encouraged best practice, quite the opposite. 
However the cost of developing and maintaining a WS-Security based solution would 
have been so high that it was decided that inventing a new security solution based on 
examples shown by others was feasible in this case to be able to utilize the benefits of-
fered by RESTful Web Services. 
When comparing the presented solution with traditional secure Web applications there 
are some clear security improvements. These improvements include as Man in The 
Middle protection for SSL via certificate pinning, request authentication and integrity 
protection with Hashed Message Authentication Codes and authorization of the end user 
devices. 
7 Conclusions 
This thesis has examined the different aspects related to offering secure services for 
mobile applications. Different axis in the research have related to the communication 
protocols, security solutions and support within the selected mobile platforms. The end-
result is a RESTful architecture which is able to fulfil the requirements originating from 
several different sources. RESTful Web Services with JSON was the natural selection 
for the integration protocol as it is natively supported by the selected mobile platforms 
and JSON requires least heavy processing by the mobile devices. 
While the stateless nature of the RESTful Web Services has generated some interesting 
challenges, the thesis presents a token based solution to which enables the client appli-
cation to hold the session state. One specific challenge remained, if the applications 
must implement an active logout scenario, the services have to somehow maintain the 
state of the revoked tokens. While this could be seen as violation of the RESTful princi-
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ples, looking at the big picture it is a rather minor issue which can be solved with pre-
sented solution involving a token revocation list. 
Although RESTful Web Services currently lack formally standardized security solu-
tions, a modular solution was constructed partially based on examples and best practices 
utilized by others. The strength of the modular solution is in the independent building 
blocks. It is possible to utilize the HMAC signature scheme without device registration 
or vice versa, and the session security token solution can be used to complement either 
or both of these approaches. Final decision regarding the security solution should al-
ways be based on the actual business requirements; more security comes with more 
complexity and cost. 
The research did not challenge Dr Fielding’s doctoral dissertation regarding where to 
store the authentication state of the session. However since the target of Fielding’s dis-
sertation was more focused on open and highly scalable Web Services it might be an 
interesting area for future research to investigate if the same really holds for “closed” 
Web Services where all services require previous authentication. It might be possible to 
replace the token based approach with a cookie based identifiers and still maintain the 
stateless benefits. This would require that the session management would be established 
as an independent core service and removed from the Web Service layer.  
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